Kant’s Existential Dualism
Various scholars in Kant studies (e.g., Watkins, Chignell, Ameriks) seem to agree that Kant is a dualist of one sort or another. For example, his commitment to transcendental rationalism, to the phenomenal/noumenal distinction of the theoretical philosophy, and to the human disposition of his moral and religious philosophy makes materialism of any kind a hard sell in Kant interpretation.What kind of dualist Kant must be is more difficult to determine and garners much less agreement.
In three stages, this paper seeks to argue for a particular body-soul dualism that is entailed by Kant’s philosophy. First, by addressing how Kant is not a materialist. Second, the establishment of Kant’s epistemic grounds for dualism. Third, the rational dimension and existential significance of faith that will account for the specific way Kant’s dualism unfolds in the critical philosophy.