Some Remarks on Neo-Molinism, Infinite Intelligence, and Providence

This paper argues that the alleged providential utility of the neo-Molinist account of divine providence (via Gregory Boyd’s infinite intelligence argument) doesn’t work.

Contrary to what Boyd avers it is not the case that God, given openness assumptions, can prepare for every possibility as effectively as if he were certain such possibilities were going to occur.

Nor is it the case that he could be guaranteed, even in principle, that his ultimate purposes for creation would be fulfilled when those purposes depend on the decisions of libertarian free creatures.

Therefore, that a God who has infallible foreknowledge of what his creatures will freely do—as would be the case on a Molinist or a simple-foreknowledge account—has a clear advantage and is preferable, providentially speaking, to the God of neo-Molinism.

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