Search Results for: Paul Copan

The Naturalness of Belief and Theism’s Rationality

In 2018, Lexington Books released The Naturalness of Belief: New Essays on Theism’s Rationality, co-edited by Paul Copan and Charles Taliaferro. Paul Copan is professor and Pledger Family Chair of Philosophy and Ethics at Palm Beach Atlantic University. Charles Taliaferro is professor of philosophy at St. Olaf College.

Enjoy a 30% discount [expires: 9/1/2019] at Rowman.com/Lexington by using LEX30AUTH18 when ordering.

From the publisher’s description:

Despite its name, “naturalism” as a world-view turns out to be rather unnatural in its strict and more consistent form of materialism and determinism. This is why a number of naturalists opt for a broadened version that includes objective moral values, intrinsic human dignity, consciousness, beauty, personal agency, and the like. But in doing so, broad naturalism begins to look more like theism. As many strict naturalists recognize, broad naturalism must borrow from the metaphysical resources of a theistic world-view, in which such features are very natural, common sensical, and quite “at home” in a theistic framework. 
The Naturalness of Belief begins with a naturalistic philosopher’s own perspective of naturalism and naturalness. The remaining chapters take a multifaceted approach in showing theism’s naturalness and greater explanatory power. They examine not only rational reasons for theism’s ability to account for consciousness, intentionality, beauty, human dignity, free will, rationality, and knowledge; they also look at common sensical, existential, psychological, and cultural reasons—in addition to the insights of the cognitive science of religion.

The Naturalness of Belief: New Essays on Theism’s Rationality

In 2018, Lexington Books published The Naturalness of Belief: New Essays on Theism’s Rationality, edited by Paul Copan and Charles Taliaferro. Paul Copan is professor and Pledger Family Chair of Philosophy and Ethics at Palm Beach Atlantic University. Charles Taliaferro is professor of philosophy at St. Olaf College.

From the publisher’s description of The Naturalness of Belief: 

Despite its name, “naturalism” as a world-view turns out to be rather unnatural in its strict and more consistent form of materialism and determinism. This is why a number of naturalists opt for a broadened version that includes objective moral values, intrinsic human dignity, consciousness, beauty, personal agency, and the like. But in doing so, broad naturalism begins to look more like theism. As many strict naturalists recognize, broad naturalism must borrow from the metaphysical resources of a theistic world-view, in which such features are very natural, common sensical, and quite “at home” in a theistic framework.

The Naturalness of Belief begins with a naturalistic philosopher’s own perspective of naturalism and naturalness. The remaining chapters take a multifaceted approach in showing theism’s naturalness and greater explanatory power. They examine not only rational reasons for theism’s ability to account for consciousness, intentionality, beauty, human dignity, free will, rationality, and knowledge; they also look at common sensical, existential, psychological, and cultural reasons—in addition to the insights of the cognitive science of religion.

Enjoy a presentation with Taliaferro fro the Centre for Philosophy of Religion annual conference on “Supernaturalism and Naturalism: Beyond the Divide,” June 23, 2018, at Heythrop College University of London.

New Volumes on Criticisms and Defenses of the Kalam Argument

In November 2017, Bloomsbury Academic will publish The Kalam Cosmological Argument: Philosophical Arguments for the Finitude of the Past, vol 1, and then The Kalam Cosmological Argument: Scientific Evidence for the Beginning of the Universe, vol. 2, co-edited by former EPS presidents, William Lane Craig and Paul Copan. William Lane Craig is a Professor of Philosophy at Talbot School of Theology and at Houston Baptist University. Paul Copan is the Pledger Family Chair of Philosophy and Ethics at Palm Beach Atlantic University

From the publisher’s description for volume 1:

Did the universe begin to exist? If so, did it have a cause? Or could it have come into existence uncaused, from nothing? These questions are taken up by the medieval-though recently-revived-kalam cosmological argument, which has arguably been the most discussed philosophical argument for God’s existence in recent decades. The kalam’s line of reasoning maintains that the series of past events cannot be infinite but rather is finite. Since the universe could not have come into being uncaused, there must be a transcendent cause of the universe’s beginning, a conclusion supportive of theism. This anthology on the philosophical arguments for the finitude of the past asks: Is an infinite series of past events metaphysically possible? Should actual infinites be restricted to theoretical mathematics, or can an actual infinite exist in the concrete world? These essays by kalam proponents and detractors engage in lively debate about the nature of infinity and its conundrums; about frequently-used kalam argument paradoxes of Tristram Shandy, the Grim Reaper, and Hilbert’s Hotel; and about the infinity of the future.

From the publisher’s description for volume 2:

The ancient kalam cosmological argument maintains that the series of past events is finite and that therefore the universe began to exist. Two recent scientific discoveries have yielded plausible prima facie physical evidence for the beginning of the universe. The expansion of the universe points to its beginning-to a Big Bang-as one retraces the universe’s expansion in time. And the second law of thermodynamics, which implies that the universe’s energy is progressively degrading, suggests that the universe began with an initial low entropy condition. The kalam cosmological argument-perhaps the most discussed philosophical argument for God’s existence in recent decades-maintains that whatever begins to exist must have a cause. And since the universe began to exist, there must be a transcendent cause of its beginning, a conclusion which is confirmatory of theism. So this medieval argument for the finitude of the past has received fresh wind in its sails from recent scientific discoveries. This collection reviews and assesses the merits of the latest scientific evidences for the universe’s beginning. It ends with the kalam argument’s conclusion that the universe has a cause-a personal cause with properties of theological significance.

Philosophia Christi Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 2017)

The Summer 2017 issue of Philosophia Christi features wide-ranging discussions in epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of religion, ethics, philosophical theology, and apologetics including contributions from J.P. Moreland, Paul Copan, Charles Taliaferro, Walter Schultz, Michael McFall, Bradley Seeman, and many others!

Topics include:

  • whether naturalistic theories of emergence are compatible with science 
  • whether “New Wave” Kantian philosophy of religion is compatible with Kant’s Deism 
  • an assessment of the latest philosophical defenses of the sanctity of the unborn 
  • whether benevolence is insufficient for Christian love 
  • how should the conditions and tasks of apologetics be reassessed in light of various epistemological challenges. 

Among the articles, philosophical notes, or book reviews, this Summer 2017 issue also features extended interactions with the works of Charles Taylor, Brian Leftow, Stuart Kauffman, James Mumford, and Myron B. Penner.

Become a first-time member of the Evangelical Philosophical Society [includes annual subscription to Philosophia Christi] or a journal-only subscriber!

New Dictionary of Christianity and Science

In April 2017, Zondervan is set to publish the Dictionary of Christianity and Science, edited by Paul Copan, Tremper Longman, Christopher L. Reese, and Michael G. Strauss. Paul Copan is the Pledger Family Chair of Philosophy and Ethics at Palm Beach Atlantic University in West Palm Beach, Florida. Tremper Longman III is the Robert H. Gundry Professor of Biblical Studies and the chair of the Religious Studies department at Westmont College in Santa Barbara, California Christopher L. Reese is marketing manager at B&H Academic publishers. Michael G. Strauss is a David Ross Boyd Professor of Physics at the University of Oklahoma in Norman, Oklahoma. From the publisher’s description:

The Dictionary of Christianity and Science provides, in one volume, entries on over 450 key terms, theories, individuals, movements, and debates at the intersection of Christian faith and contemporary science.

In addition, because certain topics such as the age of the Earth and the historicity of Adam and Eve provoke disagreement among Christians, the dictionary includes “Counterpoints”-like essays that advocate for the views most commonly held among evangelicals. Representatives of leading perspectives present their arguments vigorously but respectfully in these advocacy essays, allowing readers to compare options and draw their own conclusions. The dictionary is also fully cross-referenced and entries include references and recommendation for further reading.

Edited by Paul Copan, Tremper Longman III, Christopher L. Reese, and Michael G. Strauss, the Dictionary of Christianity and Science features a top-notch lineup of over 140 contributors in the fields of biblical studies, theology, philosophy, history, and various sciences. A unique reference work, it will be useful for scholars, pastors, students, and any Christian wanting to better understand the most relevant issues and ideas at the intersection of Christian faith and science.

A Little Book for New Philosophers: Why and How to Study Philosophy

In 2016, IVP Academic published A Little Book for New Philosophers: Why and How to Study Philosophy by Paul Copan. Paul Copan (PhD, Marquette University) is the Pledger Family Chair of Philosophy and Ethics at Palm Beach Atlantic University.

From the publisher’s description of A Little Book for New Philosophers: 

What’s the point of studying philosophy when we have theology? Is philosophy anything more than a preparation for apologetics? 

Often called “theology’s handmaid,” philosophy has sometimes suffered from an inferiority complex in the church. Many Christians see little point in it at all. But as Paul Copan contends, it is possible to affirm theology’s preeminence without diminishing the value and contribution of philosophy.

In A Little Book for New Philosophers, Copan offers a concise introduction to the study of philosophy. Aimed at newcomers, this brief overview is both a survey of philosophy’s basic aims and categories and an apology for its proper function in the life of the Christian. “By God’s grace,” Copan writes, “philosophy can enhance our understanding and worship of God . . . and assist us in defending the coherence of our faith in the Lord Jesus Christ.”

2016 CALL FOR PAPERS: Southeast Region of the EPS

14th Spring Meeting

“God and Evil,” with Dr. Paul Copan, Plenary Speaker

In conjunction with the Southeast Region of the Evangelical Theological Society

Columbia International University (SC)

 March 18-19, 2016

1. Send philosophy paper proposals/abstracts by February 1st, 2016 to program chair, Brendon Helms at helms.brendon@gmail.com.  All submissions must include an abstract (300 words maximum) that describe the main argument of the paper (and include your name, institution, and paper title).

Some priority is given to EPS members.  Conference presenters must be registered for the ETS/EPS conference.  The conference will be held March 18-19 at Columbia International University.  The theme for the overall conference will be “God and Evil” at the plenary speaker will be Dr. Paul Copan, Professor of Philosophy and Ethics at Palm Beach Atlantic University.

2. To join EPS, go to staging.epsociety.org 

3. Details for registration and lodging forthcoming.
 
4. EPS southeast regional program chair:
Brendon Helms
Ratio Christi
Indian Trail, NC 28079

The EPS at AAR/SBL 2014 Meeting

The EPS is pleased to host two sessions at the 2014 meeting of the AAR/SBL at the San Diego Convention Center (111 W Harbor Drive, San Diego, CA 92101).

Session #1: “Finding the Theistic Foundations of Morality”

Date and time: Saturday, November 22, 7:00 – 10:00 PM

Room: Hilton Bayfront-300B

Chair: Paul Copan (Ph.D), Palm Beach Atlantic University

David Baggett (Ph.D), co-author of Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality (OUP)

Steve Dilley (Ph.D), editor of Darwinian Evolution and Classical Liberalism (Lexington)

Scott Smith (Ph.D), author of In Search of Moral Knowledge: Overcoming the Fact-Value Dichotomy (IVP).

Angus Menuge (Ph.D), editor of Legitimizing Human Rights: Secular and Religious Perspectives (Ashgate).

Session  #2: “Punishment and Christian Love”

Date and time: Sunday, November 23, 7:00 – 9:30 pm

Room: Hilton Bayfront-300B

Chair: Gregory Bock, Ph.D., Walters State Community College 

“The Emerging Ethics of Restorative Justice: The Moral Vision of Howard Zehr and the Contemporary Theological Understanding of Justice”

Yutaka Osakabe, Ph.D.(candidate), University of Aberdeen

“Communicating Tough Love: Christian Love and a Communicative Theory of Punishment”

Jeffrey Cervantez (Ph.D), Crafton Hills College, and Gregory Bock (Ph.D), Walters State

“Doing (Reprobative) Justice by Forgiving the Impenitent”

Chad Bogosian (Ph.D), Grand Canyon University

“Justice and Love: The Moral Underpinnings of Just Retribution”

Daryl Charles (Ph.D), John Jay Institute

The Contingency Problem: Why Human Rights Cannot be Naturalized

PRECIS: “The Contingency Problem: Why Human Rights Cannot be Naturalized,” chapter 3 of Angus J. L. Menuge, ed., Legitimizing Human Rights: Secular and Religious Perspectives (Ashgate, 2013).

A human right is a just entitlement one has simply in virtue of being human: human rights are universal, inherent and inalienable.  Rooted in our nature as human beings, they can neither be granted nor revoked by the state or any other temporal authority.  Many of today’s ardent defenders of human rights are secularists whose underlying worldview is naturalism.  But can naturalism provide an adequate foundation for human rights?

For naturalism, a human being is one occurrence among many, distinguished only by its natural history.  That history consists of contingent events which have shaped every human faculty, including the moral sense.   As Charles Darwin emphasized in The Descent of Man, this has radical implications for our understanding of morality.  It implies that if our natural history had been relevantly different, our moral sense would not be the same.  Thus:

If…men were reared under precisely the same conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried females would, like the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters; and no one would think of interfering (Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998), 102).

In Darwin’s nightmare scenario, human beings might have thought that fratricide and infanticide were moral duties.  But the important question for human rights is:

Would fratricide and infanticide then have been moral duties? 

Evolutionary Ethics (EE) offers two answers to this question: Weak EE and Strong EE. Weak EE is a thesis of moral psychology: it gives an account of the origin of moral sentiments and beliefs.  It has no ontological implications for morality (it is compatible with both the existence and the non-existence of objective moral values), and it does not imply that our moral perceptions are reliable.  Strong EEclaims that our psychological states reliably track moral reality and that they do so because what counts as a moral value itself depends on biological history, so it does have ontological implications.

Yet, whether strong or weak, EE is in trouble. First, suppose Strong EE is affirmed.  Then there cannot be inalienable human rights, because changes in biological history can abridge or even withdraw those rights.  For example, if all human beings have a fundamental right to life, this must include brothers and female infants.  Yet, as Darwin points out, there are possible biological histories in which these humans have no such right, because fratricide and female infanticide are moral duties.  Indeed, by social engineering, a tyrant might make it the case that fratricide and female infanticide are right by compelling people to raise their children like hive bees!  So the whole idea that one has a right to life as a matter of normative necessity is undermined.Now suppose Weak EE is affirmed.  Then although being raised like a hive bee would not make fratricide a duty, our moral sense would tell us that it was.  If so, our moral beliefs do not provide reliable access to moral reality.  Even if our actual moral beliefs about fratricide happen to be true, this is a coincidence.  It no more constitutes knowledge than does the belief of someone lucky enough to learn the right time from a broken clock.  So Weak EE fails to account for moral knowledge.

So, the basic dilemma for EE is this.  If EE is correct then either: (1) human rights do not exist or (2) they are unknowable.   In fact, I argue that either moral skepticism or moral anti-realism is the most plausible conclusion to draw from a Darwinian account of human nature.  Quite obviously though, those supporting human rights protections believe that human rights are both real and knowable, and so they are best advised to look elsewhere for a noncontingent foundation for human rights, with biblical theism a leading candidate (as Paul Copan shows in his chapter).

For further exploration

  • One response to the metaphysical inadequacies of standard versions of naturalism as a foundation for objective moral values is naturalized Platonism.  On this view “nature” includes both ordinary contingent physical objects and abstract objects, which might include moral universals.  This allows for the existence of objective moral values and hence is consistent with the existence of human rights.  But how plausible is this view?  Can it really claim in good faith to be a version of naturalism?  How and why do objective values exist?  Why, given all the other contents of the cosmos, are humans especially valuable?  What, if any, is the connection between the Platonic realm of values and the physical cosmos?  Is there any credible account of how we could come to know these moral values?
  • In his recent book, Mind and Cosmos (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), Thomas Nagel offers a third way between naturalism and theism, a panpsychist version of neutral monism according to which the cosmos includes both standard physical laws and teleological principles.  Unlike his anti-realist colleague Sharon Street, Nagel is a moral realist.  Could his neutral monist scheme provide an alternative non-theistic foundation for human rights?  If human flourishing is among the goals of the teleological principles built into nature, does that explain why there are human rights?  Or is the existence of such teleological principles just as puzzling as the human rights it is invoked to explain?
  • Can a naturalist hope to show that even if humans do not have certain rights as a matter of normative necessity, still it is an important contingent fact that all and only recent humans do have special rights?  In particular, given the apparent physical differences between human beings (with many physical properties being degreed and/or not uniformly distributed), can naturalists locate some feature of all and only recent human beings in virtue of which it can plausibly be claimed that they all have special value?  Is there any way for the naturalist believer in human rights to overcome Peter Singer’s allegation that such talk is “speciesist”?
  • The Christian theist should agree with the naturalist that human beings do have important limitations: we are finite creatures, infected by sin.  Given our flawed cognitive capacities, how credible is it, even on theism, that we can know human rights?  Given the disagreements among theists about human rights, what are the best criteria for adjudicating disputes?
  • If a naturalist philosopher follows Peter Singer in concluding that human rights do not exist, what is the best approach to convincing her that they do?  Is it reasonable to think such a person can be persuaded to accept human rights while remaining a non-theist?   Or is it better to provide other arguments for theism and then show the theistic support for human rights?