In a recent interview in the UK based Third Way magazine, Richard Dawkins affirmed:
‘I’m damn sure there’s more to the universe than we understand… there may be some things that we never understand. But I think I draw the line at saying because we don’t understand it, therefore some kind of theistic interpretation is therefore more plausible. I suspect that the truth, when and if we discover it, will be far grander and more mysterious than anything that theists have ever imagined.’ (Third Way, ‘Said the atheist to the (ex) Bishop’, September 2008, p. 10.)
A few brief observations:
1) Dawkins almost sounds here like a proponent of the theological ‘way of negation’ which holds (rightly or wrongly) that we can only say what God is not, and not what God is.
2) While everyone seems agreed that there is indeed a bad, ‘God of the gaps’ form of theistic argument (at least when it is an ‘argument from ignorance’), arguments in natural theology needn’t be, and generally aren’t, formulated along such fallacious lines.
3) The main question this quote raises in my mind is whether Dawkins hasn’t come accross St. Anselm’s definition of God as ‘the greatest conceivable being’ or ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’. Of course, since Dawkins critiques the ontological argument in The God Delusion he must have come accross Anselm’s definition. How, then, can he think that any as-yet-to-be-discovered truth could possibly be greater than the greatest possible being? I can only surmise that Dawkins’ (literally) doesn’t understand what he is talking about on this issue.
4) Is Dawkins contradicting the values-subjectivism he elsewhere explicitly embraces by talking about the possibility of discovering ‘grander’ truths? If not, then how can a merely subjective ‘grander’ truth be any greater than God, especially when God is defined as the objectively ‘maximally great being’? Dawkins is either contradicting himself or undercutting himself here.
5) Perhaps if Dawkins came to understand the meaning of the phrase ‘greatest possible being’ he wouldn’t think of theistic belief as a ‘medieval’ place-holder for something grander. And if he thought more deeply about God so-defined than he does in The God Delusion (where he basically passes the ball to Hume and Kant) then he might look more kindly upon St. Anselm’ ontological meditations upon that theme…