Search Results for: Richard Swinburne

EPS 2017: “Debating Christian Physicalism”

Posted on November 13, 2017 by - 2017 EPS Conference, brandon rickabaugh, christian physicalism, eric olson, jonathan loose, jp moreland, kevin corcoran, nancey murphy, richard swinburne, substance dualism

Enjoy this Panel Discussion at the Annual ETS-EPS Conference in Providence, Rhode Island, November 15-17!

Date: Thursday, November 16
Time: 3:00 PM – 6:10 PM
Room: Omni – Waterplace I

“Debating Christian Physicalism”

Moderator: Angus Menuge (Concordia University Wisconsin)
Panelists:

    See the forthcoming Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism and then Christian Physicalism? Philosophical Theological Criticisms. 

    Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism editors, Angus Menuge, JP Moreland, and Jonathan Loose

    Support the EPS to expand its reach, support its members, and be a credible presence of Christ-shaped philosophical interests in the academy and into the wider culture! Right now, there couldn’t be a better time to multiply your support of the EPS in light of a $25,000 matching grant from an anonymous donor. Help us reach and exceed our $50,000 goal by December 31st.

    Keith Ward: On a Reformulation of Trinitarian Doctrine

    Posted on October 11, 2016 by - Christ and Cosmos (book), featured books, keith ward, richard swinburne, social trinity, trinitarianism

    20% off key titles from Cambridge University Press until February 28, 2017!

    Cambridge University Press recently published Christ and the Cosmos: A Reformulation of Trinitarian Doctrine (2015) by Keith Ward.  Ward is Professorial Research Fellow at Heythrop College, University of London and Fellow of the British Academy. From the publisher’s description:

    The concept of the ‘social Trinity’, which posits three conscious subjects in God, radically revised the traditional Christian idea of the Creator. It promoted a view of God as a passionate, creative and responsive source of all being. Keith Ward argues that social Trinitarian thinking threatens the unity of God, however, and that this new view of God does not require a ‘social’ component. Expanding on the work of theologians such as Barth and Rahner, who insisted that there was only one mind of God, Ward offers a coherent, wholly monotheistic interpretation of the Trinity. Christ and the Cosmos analyses theistic belief in a scientific context, demonstrating the necessity of cosmology to theological thinking that is often overly myopic and anthropomorphic. This important volume will benefit those who seek to understand what the Trinity is, why it matters and how it fits into a scientific account of the universe.

    The Winter 2016 issue of Philosophia Christi (vol. 18, no. 2) will feature a unique symposium on Christ and Cosmos, with a lead article by Keith Ward, followed by responses from Richard Swinburne, Stephen Davis, Tom McCall, William Hasker, Dale Tuggy and many others. The critical interactions will not only interest those who track philosophical discussions on the trinity, but will interest readers eager to understand the implications of the doctrine of the trinity for other areas of philosophy and theology. In addition to this first-time symposium, the Winter issue includes the latest critiques of philosophical naturalism, Reformed Epistemology, along with insightful reviews of books in philosophy, theology and apologetics.

    Subscribe/Renew today! All EPS members receive an annual journal subscription with their membership, along with access to the annual meeting.

    Interview with Andrew Loke: A Kryptic Model of the Incarnation

    Posted on December 18, 2015 by - andrew loke, incarnation, interview, kryptic model of the incarnation (book)

    Christian philosophers and theologians continue to work-out different models for understanding the complexities of the incarnation, especially in light of objections to the doctrine and fidelity to Christian tradition and witness. Andrew Loke recently published A Kryptic Model of the Incarnation (Ashgate, 2014). Andrew is Research Assistant Professor at The University of Hong Kong.

    In the following interview, we discuss his ‘kryptic model’ and some of its implications in light of different approaches to the doctrine of the Incarnation. He also situates his model in light of biblical and historical theology interests. Finally, he offers some perspective on what the kryptic model might achieve among inter-religious and inter-denominational discussions.
      
    When you stand in awe of the incarnation of Jesus Christ, what is it that most captures your imagination? Where does your mind begin to immediately wonder?

    The Maker of the universe becoming a child on earth for us–what an astonishing thought! What a real historical event worthy of the greatest celebration! My mind and heart are captivated by those glorious carols which are sung every Christmas. I particularly like this line from “Hark! The Herald Angels Sing”:

    Veiled in flesh the Godhead see
    Hail the incarnate deity
    Pleased as man with man to dwell
    Jesus, our Emmanuel
    Hark! The herald angels sing
    ‘Glory to the newborn King!’

    Is the messianic identity and mission of Jesus the central concern of the doctrine of the incarnation? If so, is the ‘metaphysics of’ and ‘theology of’ that concern a subsidiary interest or something else? How do you see this?

    The messianic identity and mission are indeed central, but the doctrine of the Incarnation also needs to be defended against the accusation of incoherence by sceptics from various traditions (Jewish, Islamic, etc.) throughout the centuries.  They have pointed out, for example, that being divine entails being omniscient and omnipotent, but the New Testament portrays Jesus as having human properties such as being apparently limited in knowledge (Mark 13:32) and power (John 4:3-6).

    Many Christians have responded by saying that the Incarnation is a mystery. This is true, but the inadequacy with simply replying ‘mystery’ is that, since the Christian wants to make meaningful statements by affirming, for example, that the divine nature includes omniscience and that Jesus was apparently limited in knowledge as stated by the Scriptures, he/she must demonstrate what is meant (or what could possibly be meant) by these statements; it is not enough to claim that it is a ‘mystery’ and leave it as that. Moreover, the Christian must ensure that the explications of these statements do not result in contradictions. The problem with asserting that one can make contradictory statements about Jesus (e.g. ‘Jesus has complete awareness of everything and complete unawareness of everything simultaneously’) is that the person who makes such contradictory statements is not affirming anything about Jesus. Affirming ‘complete awareness of everything’ and ‘complete unawareness of everything’ simply cancel each other out; it is like writing something and then immediately erasing it, such that one ends up with nothing that is affirmed of Jesus.

    Therefore, in order to make meaningful statements about Jesus in accordance with the Scriptures and to rebut the charge of incoherence, the Christian has to provide a model to show how concepts like omniscience and apparent limitation in knowledge can be affirmed of Jesus such that no contradiction results. The work which has been done in this area by metaphysicians and theologians can help to address the accusation of incoherence and open up conceptual spaces, so as to allow the Scriptural account of the Incarnation to be affirmed in all its glory and illuminate our understanding of God and humanity.

    Systematic philosophical and theological accounts of the incarnation attempt to weigh-in on serious metaphysical, exegetical, theological and historical problems with the doctrine of the incarnation. Rigorous analysis and problematizing of issues seems to be the main approach. What are the limits and opportunities of such approach in light of the central concern of the doctrine of the incarnation?

    Such an approach can be useful for clearing away the obstacles to the reception of the Messiah as God Incarnate. In particular, offering a defensible model of the Incarnation can aid our understanding of Scriptural passages relevant to the Incarnation and protect us against heretical notions. It can also be helpful for resolving longstanding interdenominational disagreements concerning the Incarnation, such as those between Chalcedonian and non-Chalcedonian churches, Dyothelites and Monothelites, and Lutherans and Reformed theologians. A review of church history shows that these disagreements are to a large extent due to neither side being able to see how the position of the other side could be possible within the bounds of orthodoxy. For example, the Reformed theologians fail to see how the Lutheran’s position on the unity of Christ’s person could avoid compromising Christ’s humanity, while the Lutherans fail to see how the reformed position on the distinction of natures could avoid compromising his unity. Hence, proposing a defensible model that would address the concerns of both sides would be very useful indeed, and further work in this area should be encouraged. However, this should be done with a clear recognition of its limitation, namely that it is not intended to provide an exhaustive description of Christ, and hence does not aim to dispel all mystery.

    What are the main theses of your ‘kryptic model’ of the incarnation?

    The key insight is that a divine person can refrain from utilizing his omnipotence when he carries out certain activities, such as walking to a town in Samaria. One can therefore suggest that the Son of God did this by the finite strength of his human body instead of utilizing his divine powers, hence he could experience fatigue as portrayed in John 4:3-6.

    Likewise knowledge can be understood as a kind of power which one can refrain from utilizing. For example, a person might have knowledge of calculus, even though he might not be consciously thinking about calculus all the time. This knowledge of calculus can be said to be in his preconscious: when he chooses to utilize this knowledge by directing his attention to it, that is, when he chooses to consciously think about calculus, he can become aware of calculus.

    Since having knowledge of a certain thing such as calculus does not require a constant conscious awareness of that thing, the knowledge of all things by a divine Person does not require a constant conscious awareness of all things by him. Thus, it could be the case that a divine Person chose to let his knowledge of all things reside in his divine preconscious at the Incarnation, and he freely chose not to utilize all of the knowledge in his preconscious, so as to consciously experience our human limitations.

    Concerning Mark 13:32, it should be noted that the Greek word οἶδεν which is translated as ‘know’ means ‘to have realized, perceived, to know’; this word is often used in the New Testament in a general way, e.g. to know a person, to be able to understand/apprehend/recognize (TDNT vol.5, pp.116-119). Therefore, in view of its semantic range, in this passage οἶδεν can be legitimately rendered as ‘aware’. Thus, Mark 13:32 can be read as ‘But of that day or hour no one is aware, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father alone.’ This reading fits the context perfectly: the disciples would be hoping that the Son would reveal to them the day of his coming, but no one can reveal what he/she is not aware. For our purposes here, it is important to note that such an unawareness of the Son can co-exist with omniscience in the same person because, as noted previously, omniscience does not require a conscious awareness of all the things known. A divine person can use his omnipotence to restrict the scope of his conscious awareness as well as the utilization of his omniscience, and in this state of self-restraint the Son was genuinely unaware of that day; it was not a sham.

    What do you take to be the most salient evidence in support of your model?

    The New Testament portrays Christ as having divine powers including the knowledge of all things (e.g. John 16:30, 21:17), but not utilizing them in all situations (e.g. Mark 13:32 and John 4:3-6 noted previously). His divine powers were largely ‘hidden’ (‘Krypsis’ in Greek) during the Incarnation, and only utilized on certain occasions to reveal his glory (e.g. John 2:1–11).  This is what my model postulates.

    What might be the most contestable aspects of your model?

    Its complexity. C. Stephen Evans told me that one standard criterion for the plausibility of a hypothesis is simplicity, and that my model fares poorly in this regard, for it seems to be much more complicated than alternative models such as the Two Consciousnesses Model and the Ontological Kenotic Model, and at times it seems as if it labours with ad hoc additions such as ‘it is possible that…’

    This is an important objection, but I think it is answerable. Simplicity is a virtue and the charge of being ad hoc is valid only if all other things are equal. In this case it is not the case that all other things are equal, because alternative models such as the Two Consciousnesses Model and the Ontological Kenotic Model have significant problems which disappear on my Kryptic Model. Given this, the additions that my model makes are not ad hoc, because they help us to make sense of the Incarnation, the historical evidence for which has been defended by distinguished historians of early Christianity (e.g. N.T. Wright, Craig Keener) and eminent philosophers of religion (e.g. Richard Swinburne, William Lane Craig). Additionally, it seems that a great level of complexity in the metaphysics is only to be expected given the sheer difficulty of the idea that a person could at the same time be a human as well as the Maker of the universe, thus the kind of additions that my model makes seems warranted.

    What does your model make possible and plausible that other models fail to accomplish?

    My model makes it possible to affirm that Christ had a single consciousness yet retained his divine powers at the Incarnation.

    The plausibility of the model can be seen when we reflect on the following train of thought. Given that the Two Consciousnesses Model would entail the difficulties that Christ could have two contradictory self-consciousnesses simultaneously and that there could be an I–Thou relationship between these consciousnesses, which implies Nestorianism, Christ could have only one consciousness. Given the difficulty (which besets the Ontological Kenotic Model) of answering whether a divine person would still be divine if he were to give up his omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence (cf. Ps.147:4–5, Luke 1:37, Jer. 23:23–4 etc.), Christ must in some way be in possession of these properties (and this seems more consistent with Scriptural passages such as John 16:30, 21:17; Col. 1:17) but not utilizing them in all the acts that he did while he was in his incarnate state. This is what my model postulates of Christ.

    In addition, my model answers other difficult questions facing the Divine Subconscious Model which have not been adequately addressed by previous versions of this model. For example, by postulating that the divine preconscious was not part of his human nature but was part of his divine nature, and that the divine nature and human nature were concrete and distinct parts of Christ, my model avoids a Monophysite mixture. Moreover, my model avoids Apollinarianism by postulating a human preconscious alongside a divine preconscious. While some recent advocates of the Divine Subconscious Model have denied Dyothelitism, I demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6 that my model is consistent with the Dyothelitism of Maximus the Confessor.

    Can you outline further work to be done by philosophers and theologians in light of your kryptic model of the incarnation?

    The Incarnation is one of the central doctrines of Christian theology. It is the culmination of divine revelation, and therefore ought to determine our understanding of God and humanity. Christian theologian and philosophers working on the explication of Divine Attributes, the Doctrine of the Trinity and theological anthropology cannot afford to ignore how the Incarnation is to be understood. Working on these issues in light of this Kryptic model would involve, for example, the rejection of a strong version of divine immutability and essential timelessness, as well as the rejection of a physicalist account of human nature, as argued in Chapter 6 of my book.

    Another potentially fruitful area of research concerns inter-denominational and inter-religious dialogues. Breakthroughs might be achieved by utilizing the insights provided by the Kryptic model to address the concerns and objections related to the Incarnation, which can be found in the writings of Chalcedonian and non-Chalcedonian churches, Lutheran and Reformed traditions etc., as well in the writings of Jehovah Witnesses, and Islamic and Judaist theologians etc. throughout the centuries. Hopefully, this would result in greater unity within the body of Christ, and more effective witness to the glory of the Incarnation.

    A Tale of Two Naturalisms: Churchland, McGinn and Plantinga’s “Advice for Christian Philosophers”

    Posted on June 5, 2014 by - advice to Christian philosophers, alvin plantinga, charles taliaferro, contingency, jp moreland, naturalism, patricia churchland, richard swinburne, scientism, soul, stewart goetz, the soul (book), thomas nagel

    Many naturalists embrace some version of scientism, holding that modern science is the only or the chief authority regarding our knowledge of objective reality.  And this includes our self-knowledge.  At one extreme are eliminative materialists like Patricia Churchland who dismiss the idea of souls as lazy, defensive, armchair metaphysics.   In her latest work, Touching a Nerve: The Self as Brain, Churchland’s main message is that philosophers should get out more, and explore the wonders of empirical neuroscience.  Then they will come to agree with her: “I think about my brain…as me.” (11)  Churchland is quite certain: materialistic science has got us taped.


    Yet some naturalists are not so sure.   A leading doubter is Colin McGinn, whose book The Mysterious Flame lays out a position known as “mysterianism.”   McGinn thinks consciousness must have arisen via evolution, and yet also maintains that none of the naturalistic accounts of consciousness (especially Churchland’s) is either plausible or illuminating.   Given that impasse, McGinn’s move is to “doubt the instrument”: our lack of understanding is due to our cognitive limitations.  On McGinn’s view, natural selection did not gift us with the kind of minds capable of understanding the relationship between consciousness and the non-conscious world.

    Are we really confined to these two alternatives?    One hopes not, and not just because of the remarkably unproductive exchange resulting from McGinn’s recent review of Churchland’s book in The New York Review of Books.   

    For one thing, both alternatives appear self-defeating.  Churchland prizes empirical science as paradigmatically rational, but ignores (or rejects) the need for a first-philosophy, which provides the ontological presuppositions of scientific practice.  These presuppositions include that scientists experience the world and can reason to conclusions about it.  But this requires conscious subjects that think about the world and remain numerically the same through a process of reasoning, none of which is possible if we are just brains: neuroscience reveals brain states without subjectivity or intentionality and in constant flux.  If we are no more than such brains, then there is no scientific rationality and no reason to be a materialist.  McGinn thinks that we cannot think reliably beyond the limits set by the historical, contingent interactions of our species with nature.  But if that were true, as Thomas Nagel realizes in his Mind and Cosmos, we could not have discovered the non-contingent norms of rationality to which science itself appeals.  McGinn’s claim to know that consciousness emerged from an evolutionary process depends on our access to rational norms which (if he is right) are above our epistemic pay grade.

    More positively, Christian philosophers should be guided by Alvin Plantinga’s celebrated “Advice to Christian Philosophers.”   We do not have to start from an assumption of scientism, but should re-envision the whole field of philosophical anthropology with the assumption that God is the premier person and that we are made in His image.   Consciousness does not have to emerge from the physical world, because it has always been exemplified by God.  And human beings are integrated wholes: mind and body are designed to work together.   But is this just pious hand-waving?   No, there are many promising attempts to work out this idea in detail.  A select list should include:  Richard Swinburne’s Mind, Brain,and Free Will, J. P. Moreland’s Consciousness and the Existence of God, The Recalcitrant Imago Dei and The Soul, Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro’s A Brief History of the Soul, and eds. Mark Baker and Stewart Goetz’s The Soul Hypothesis.   Collectively, these books show that the soul is not excluded by, but supportive of, scientific rationality, and solves numerous philosophical problems that beset naturalistic accounts, including those of Churchland and McGinn.

    Darwinian Conservatism and Free Will

    Posted on February 12, 2014 by -

    Ordered Liberty and Darwinian Human Nature

    Darwinian Conservatism claims that the central ideals of political conservatives are supported by Darwinism. In particular, Larry Arnhart argues that a Darwinian view of human nature fits nicely with the conservative ideal of ordered liberty: the intrusive central planning of the state can be minimized if citizens take personal responsibility for their actions (see Arnhart 2005 Darwinian Conservatism). This kind of buck stopping responsibility arguably assumes that a human agent has libertarian free will. Thus, Arnhart concedes that in order to support his claim that Darwinism is supportive of ordered liberty, he must show that libertarian free will plausibly arose via Darwinian processes.

    Arnhart is aware that many Darwinists have understood the Darwinian paradigm as an inherently reductionist one, according to which human beings are machines that exist to preserve their genes. He grants that this makes it hard to see how there could be free will. At the same time, Arnhart thinks the Darwinian view is incompatible with dualistic schemes which assert that minds could exist independently of the physical world. However, like John Searle, Arnhart sees emergence as a third alternative. On Arnhart’s view, a mind with powers of rationality and free will emerged as a consequence of the selection in humans of frontal lobes with greatly increased size and complexity (for more on Searle, see his 2007 Freedom and Neurobiology, and then also my “Neuroscience, Rationality and Free Will,” Philosophia Christi 15:1 [2013] 81-96).

    My critique of Arnhart

    My area of specialization is philosophy of mind, and in my chapter, I argue, contra Arnhart, that the kind of libertarian free will presupposed by the conservative ideal of ordered liberty is not plausible given a Darwinian view of human nature. This is because four of the ontological requirements for libertarian free will exceed those available in the naturalistic framework presupposed by Darwinism.

    1. The Self is a Continuant

    For a self to be responsible for its decisions, it must be the same self who deliberates, decides and acts, which means that on Arnhart’s view, the self that emerges must be a continuant something that persists over time. However, I argue that there is nothing about the underling physical processes that explains or predicts a continuant self, because those processes are in flux.

    2. The Unity of Consciousness

    The unity of consciousness also does not plausibly emerge from physical processes because a subject’s thoughts are inseparably tied to that subject and this is utterly unlike physical structures of separable objects or events. The primitive unity of the self cannot simply emerge from the rearrangement of separable parts in aggregates or processes.

    3. Teleology

    Selves make choices in order to achieve various goals which they can represent in intentional states (states that are about something beyond themselves) such as desires. However, the whole point of the Darwinian paradigm is that there is no teleology within nature: undirected processes are sufficient to account for the appearance of design. I argue at length that various attempts (including Dennett’s) to explain how human purposes and intentionality arise from non-purposive and non-intentional processes are incoherent.

    4. Downward Causation

    If we have libertarian free will, then our choices make a difference to what our brains and bodies do. But as Jaegwon Kim has argued, the kind of emergence assumed by Arnhart is inconsistent. For if one rejects dualism, one must claim that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause. So any mental states that emerge from underlying physical states cannot act back on the physical world. Indeed, I argue that to say that the mind has independent causal power is to be a dualist: emergent libertarian physicalism is not a genuine option.

    Future Directions

    My view is that philosophy of mind is increasingly dominated by bad faith naturalism: theories claiming to be naturalistic typically presuppose entities more at home in a non-naturalistic framework. Is it a coincidence that ’emergence’ has become an increasingly popular option, favored by both secular and Christian physicalists? I think that the term is generally poorly defined and frequently conceals inconsistencies both between the usage of various authors and in the thinking of a single author who hopes to mentally enjoy his mind and physically eat it too. What we most need is careful work closely defining and distinguishing various interpretations of ’emergence,’ followed by critical examination to see which (if any) of them has merit.

    My concern is that ’emergence’ is too often employed as a non-explanatory veil of confusion and evasion of more important issues. For example, has emergence become popular partly because philosophy of mind has been too preoccupied with an ontological paradigm of physical event causation? Is it really plausible that a self (something apparently in the category of a substance) can emerge from underlying event causal processes? Is not a better approach (as pursued by E. J. Lowe , J. P. Moreland , and Richard Swinburne) to reconceive causation in general (and hence agent causation in particular) as fundamentally a relation between substances? If so, is emergence helpful in conceiving an agent’s powers of rational deliberation and free will? Are there more promising alternatives? (for more on this see E. J. Lowe 2008 book, Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action; J. P. Moreland’s 2008 Consciousness and the Existence of God and his 2009 The Recalcitrant Imago Dei; and then Richard Swinburne’s 2013, Mind, Brain, and Free Will).

    More fundamentally, would we arrive at the idea of emergence if we had started by taking God Himself as the paradigm example of a rational agent? How much philosophy of mind, even when pursued by Christians, is driven by an impatient scientism, rather than a thoroughgoing theocentric and Christocentric view of reality? Philosophy of mind informed by a deep understanding of the nature of God and the hypostatic union of the two natures of Christ may lead to some fascinating breakthroughs.

    To learn more about the contributions of Darwinian Evolution and Classical Liberalism: Theories in Tension (Lexington Books, 2013), click here for a fuller discussion at the EPS website. Readers are also encouraged to take advantage of a 30% discount when purchased through Rowman and Littlefield’s website (Lex30Auth14 – this discount expires 12/31/2014).

    Is Ramified Natural Theology at odds with Christ-Shaped Philosophy?

    Posted on December 27, 2013 by - angus menuge, christ-shaped philosophy, natural law, natural theology, paul k. moser, philip stewart, ramified natural theology, robert larmer

    The Winter 2013 (vol. 15. no. 2) issue of Philosophia Christi showcases a lively discussion on the character and stature of “Ramified Natural Theology” with a lead article by Richard Swinburne. Purchase this special issue today!

    To explore some foretastes of the “Ramified Natural Theology” discussion in Philosophia Christi, please also consider these online contributions:

    While ramified natural theology is an exciting and newly popular area of scholarly inquiry, it is also one which can very quickly get one into theological trouble. In this article I explore the necessary theological presuppositions for various views of ramified natural theology, offering two models for the possible theological place of the endeavor. Distinctions in the theological role of ramified natural theology allow one to find an appropriate place for it in apologetic discourse, either as in reach to believers or outreach to unbelievers. 

    In this paper I argue that the ‘argument from miracle’ can best be understood as a powerful instance of what is coming to be known as ramified natural theology. Traditionally, it has been assumed that natural theology must eschew consideration of special revelation from God and consider only data that is available to unaided reason. This, however, is to ignore the fact that a purported revelation may include content that is empirically verifiable and thus within the purview of natural theology. Miracles are publicly observable events that cry out for an explanation. One need not come to such events already accepting the interpretation placed on them by religious believers – the Bible can be read as historical evidence rather than authoritative Scripture – but neither is one prohibited from considering whether that interpretation does indeed provide the best understanding of the events. This opens up the possibility that someone who initially does not accept theism might at once accept both the claim of God’s existence and the claim of God’s self-disclosure. 

    Interested readers may also want to consider the following exchange between Angus Menuge and Paul Moser on “Ramified” and “Christ-shaped philosophy”:

    Paul Moser has illuminated the spiritual terrain of Christian philosophy by revealing a stark contrast between the poles of spectator natural theology and Gethsemane epistemology. In this paper, I will first suggest that Moser’s work is most helpfully viewed not as a statement about the sociological habits of Christian philosophers, but as a prophetic call to self-examination and repentance by each and every Christian philosopher. That said, I argue that between spectator natural theology and Gethsemane epistemology there does seem room for an intermediary position: a chastened natural theology which provides a lived dialectic, a “ramified personalized natural theology.” I suggest this not as a critique but as a constructive proposal for rapprochement that attempts to find a worthy place for both natural theology and an evangelistic call to a personal encounter with the living Lord. 

    Acknowledging the deficiency of traditional natural theology, Angus Menuge seeks an alternative in “ramified personalized natural theology.” I share his sense of the deficiency of traditional natural theology, but I raise some doubts about his proposed alternative, and suggest a more direct approach to the evidence for God. 

    As part of the ongoing “Christ-Shaped Philosophy” discussion with Paul Moser, this note briefly responds to two main challenges that Paul Moser makes to my suggestion that Ramified Personalized Natural Theology may constitute a third way between standard natural theology and Gethsemane epistemology. First, Moser charges that ramified natural theology is likely incoherent because ramified theology will appeal to supernatural premises. My response appeals to a forthcoming essay by Hugh Gauch (Philosophia Christi 15:2), which provides a framework in which evidence counts across competing worldviews. Second, Moser claims that the “divine personalized experience” provided by the Holy Spirit makes natural theology redundant. I appropriate Charles Taliaferro’s idea of a “golden cord,” and suggest that the evidential threads of this cord, whether natural or supernatural, provide a means by which Christ may draw us to himself. 

    This article is a rejoinder to Angus Menuge’s latest proposal of “a third way between standard natural theology and Gethsemane epistemology” for the Christ-Shaped Philosophy project. I contend that we do not have a stable third way, because any alternative to Gethsemane epistemology, like the arguments of traditional natural theology, neglects the distinctiveness of the evidence for the self-authenticating Christian God and does not offer a resilient defense of belief in this God. Advocates of the traditional arguments of natural theology fail to represent the ontological and evidential uniqueness of this God. 

     Explore the dozens of other contributions to the EPS Christ-Shaped Philosophy project.

    Introduction to a Special Issue of Philosophia Christi on Ramified Natural Theology

    Posted on August 12, 2013 by -

    Extended Discussions of Ramified Natural Theology

    In light of the Philosophia Christi (Winter 2013) themed discussion on “Ramified,” we welcome ongoing web contributions directly related to the Philosophia Christi articles or as fresh additions to that discussion. For example, consider these worthwhile papers:
    For more interactive discussions on “Ramified Natural Theology” and “Christ-Shaped Philosophy,” see the various papers at this associated web project.

    A Renaissance of “Traditional Natural Theology”

    What may be called “traditional natural theology” is widely understood as the project of establishing the existence of God and at least some of His attributes through the testimony of the senses and reason, without relying on the authority of divine revelation. Some believe traditional natural theology was dealt a mortal blow by David Hume, Immanuel Kant and other Enlightenment thinkers. To the contrary, it has undergone a startling renaissance, as evidenced by many fine volumes in recent years.

    (One could easily cite a large number of  more specialized works devoted to updated versions of the ontological, cosmological, teleological and moral arguments as well as the arguments from reason, consciousness and abstract objects).

    Beyond Natural Theology’s “Generic Theism”

    However, even if successful, the arguments of traditional natural theology can hope at best to establish a “bare” or “generic” theism: they cannot tell us which of the competing theistic religions is most likely true. The received wisdom is that further illumination about the identity of God is only available through special revelation. This assumption is challenged by an approach that Richard Swinburne has dubbed “ramified natural theology” [Richard Swinburne, “Natural Theology, Its ‘Dwindling Probabilities’ and ‘Lack of Rapport,’” Faith and Philosophy 21(4): 533-546 (2004)]. The idea is to present public evidence which discriminates between competing theistic religions because they do not all explain that evidence, or explain it equally well. While Swinburne is the most famous contemporary proponent of this approach, it has many precedents, for example in the arguments of various church fathers and of Blaise Pascal that Christianity is the true theistic religion because of its uniquely strong support by well-attested miracles and fulfilled prophecy. And Alister McGrath’s recent work may also qualify, as he develops an approach to natural theology which is both Christocentric and anchored in specifically Trinitarian theology [Alister McGrath, The Open Secret: A New Vision for Natural Theology (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008). What is controversial in McGrath’s approach is his contention that nature must be interpreted in an appropriate way to disclose its secrets: will this depend on presuppositions that are not neutral between competing worldviews?]

    The Promise of “Ramified Natural Theology”

    The promise of ramified natural theology is considerable.   On the one hand, as developed by Swinburne, ramified natural theology is an extension of traditional natural theology [Richard Swinburne, The Resurrection of God Incarnate (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) and Was Jesus God? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010)].  Thus Swinburne’s case for the truth of Christianity assumes the general background evidence for God’s existence (which he himself has developed in a powerful cumulative case argument), and supplements it with the evidence for the prior likelihood of the incarnation and the posterior unlikelihood of our having the evidence we do for the life, death and resurrection of Christ unless these events were the result of God’s plan of salvation [see Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, second edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004)].  On the other hand, it is by no means obvious that a ramified approach must build on evidence from traditional natural theology.  At least in some cases, a ramified argument may be made independently of a prior case for theism.  For example, as Hugh Gauch has pointed out, in the case for the resurrection developed by Timothy and Lydia McGrew, only Bayes factors are used, dispensing with prior probabilities.  More generally, using a likelihood approach, it is possible to assess the relative merits of a range of competing worldviews without presupposing any of them [see Hugh G. Gauch, Jr. “Natural Theology’s Case for Jesus’s Resurrection:  Methodological and Statistical Considerations,” Philosophia Christi 13 (2011):  339–55; Timothy McGrew and Lydia McGrew, “The Argument from Miracles:  A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, ed. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (West Sussex:  Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 593–662].

    To the extent that practitioners of ramified natural theology are sanguine about traditional natural theology, they can exploit the latter’s strengths by developing arguments that extend or supplement its results.  At the same time, to the extent that a ramified natural theological argument is developed independently of traditional natural theology, reservations about the latter do not justify a failure to seriously consider the former [In a recent symposium on Paul K. Moser’s religious epistemology, Moser expressed his skepticism toward the value of traditional natural theological arguments, while Kathryn Waidler, Charles Taliaferro and Harold Netland defended it, but ramified natural theology did not surface. See Philosophia Christi 14 (2) (2012), 263-311].   Ramified natural theology’s flexible relationship with traditional natural theology gives Christian apologists valuable latitude when seeking to address the diverse epistemic states of unbelievers.  For hard-nosed materialists, traditional natural theology may help provide a theistic foundation so that a case for the resurrection (or miracles in general) has more appeal.  But for many others, for whom theistic religions are among the live hypotheses, a ramified approach may be sufficient by itself to select the best worldview option.  There are many new questions and exciting opportunities in this growing area, and we are confident that the nine following essays will help to develop a sense of the potential for ramified natural theology to transform Christian philosophy and apologetics.

    The Winter 2013 “Ramified Natural Theology” Issue of Philosophia Christi

    The lead article by Richard Swinburne and the subsequent discussion in the next two articles concern Jesus’s resurrection.  Swinburne’s initial essay summarizes several of his book length studies and serves as a paradigm case of ramified natural theology.  Using a Bayesian formulation, Swinburne shows that there is one and only one individual—Jesus of Nazareth—who plausibly satisfies both the prior and the posterior requirements to be God incarnate, and that since the evidence for this is so strong, God would have to be a grand deceiver (or one who permits some lesser agent, such as the devil, to perpetrate grand deception) if some other past or future figure were the messiah, but this is incompatible with God’s perfect moral character.

    This last claim of Swinburne’s is the target of the next paper, by Robert Cavin and Carlos Colombetti.  The authors claim that Swinburne’s argument does not satisfy the demand for total evidence, because it overlooks the evidence for intentional human deception by false prophets (and self-deception) on a massive scale.  Given their disagreements about which revelation is authentic, it is arguable that either Christians or non-Christians must have been deceived in some sense. Cavin and Colombetti conclude, contra Swinburne, that it is not improbable that the evidence for the Incarnation and Resurrection is mistaken or misleading.

    In his response, Swinburne provides a close study of different kinds of deception, and argues that Cavin and Colombetti conflate God’s unjustifiable permission of deliberate deception with His allowing people to hold false beliefs or to be deceived in justifiable ways.  He claims that the examples provided by Cavin and Colombetti fall into the latter category, and that this is compatible with God’s moral perfection. This exchange is likely only the beginning of an important dialogue on the evidential impact of “negative theology” on the project of ramified natural theology.

    While this project is vitally important to Christian philosophers and apologists, is it something theologians proper should take seriously?  Rodney Holder provides several reasons for an affirmative answer.  The first is premised on the fact of religious pluralism: the many competing religions all provide internal criteria for the correctness of their beliefs, but these do not give the outsider an independent means of deciding which revelation is most likely true.  Drawing on the work of Wolfhart Pannenberg, Brian Hebblethwaite and others, Holder argues that theologians need ramified natural theology to overcome this impasse.  They also need it to avoid circular presuppositionalism and to show that Christians have a faith founded on historical fact.  As Holder concludes, “the traditional division between natural theology and revealed theology breaks down as soon as we ask why we should believe in a putative revelation and how we can commend our own perceived revelation to others.”

    Some may suspect that ramified natural theology employs an ad hoc procedure of argumentation, gerrymandered by religious apologists to show their faith in the best light.  To the contrary, Hugh Gauch argues that like natural science, ramified natural theology functions with the most basic presuppositions of empirical method required to gain factual information about the world.  Since these presuppositions are held in common between parties in disagreement, and since only public evidence and standard logic is permitted, ramified arguments are capable of objectively discriminating between worldviews.  Sound methodology is vital because, Gauch argues, “Any success and significance that ramified natural theology may have originates in, and depends on, its methodology being clear, impartial, settled, and effective.”  Gauch shows in particular that this approach is ideal for investigating the facticity of miracle claims.  Reinforcing Holder’s assessment, Gauch suggests that natural and revealed theology are not competitors but partners in a fruitful synergy.

    One of the extraordinary differences between contemporary natural theology and the natural theology of previous centuries is the former’s integration of the rigorous formalisms of deductive logic and probability theory.  Timothy McGrew and John DePoe seek to show how these technical breakthroughs provide sometimes surprising insights into what does and does not count as a strong argument of natural theology.   On the cautionary side, they show that common intuitions about the probability of deductive arguments are often wrong.  Yet they also show that an important implication of Bayes’ theorem for ramified natural theology is that the combination of many individually weak pieces of evidence can yield a cumulative case argument of great certainty.  They further point out that there are many possible goals of natural theological arguments, and that the value of the argument will often depend on the epistemic state of its audience.

    The remaining articles illustrate the wide range of potential application for a ramified approach to natural theology.

    Lydia McGrew uses a Bayesian approach to show that Jesus was the prophesied Messiah. Her argument nicely illustrates the fact that even if each piece of evidence raises the probability of a hypothesis by a modest amount, their combination can yield a powerful cumulative case argument.  She further argues that if we consider the remarkable fact that this Messiah is prophesied both to die and also to have a glorious future, the resurrection is much more probable.  This essay thus provides some further support for Swinburne’s conclusion that Jesus was God incarnate and was raised from the dead.

    The moral argument for God is a staple of natural theology and many have undertaken to establish the existence of a good God from the apparent facts of moral obligation.  In their paper, David Baggett and Ronnie Campbell seek to extend this argument by showing how Christianity provides superior resources to account for what it means to be a good God, particularly if it has been shown that such a being must be essentially loving.  This is because the Trinity does real explanatory work in showing us what it means for God to be loving in His own nature.  The authors point out that not only does this approach favor Christianity over non-Christian theistic religions, it also provides a reason to prefer some denominations over others on account of their portrait of God’s character.  They dub this intra-Christian inquiry “doubly ramified natural theology.”   This matters not only to the Christian seeking the true church, but also has an impact on non-Christians, as they may reject the faith because some denominations offer a distorted picture of what God is like.

    In a similar vein, Travis Dumsday argues that once we consider evidence such as visions and miracles which may favor Christianity over its rivals, it is an unavoidable possibility that some of this evidence will favor some denominations over others.  Dumsday argues that ramified natural theology is, in any case, already at work in interdenominational debate, since philosophical and historical arguments are used to defend or critique confessional positions e.g. on baptism, predestination and whether scripture can coherently be claimed as the sole source and norm of Christian doctrine.  Dumsday points out that these arguments are typically not decisive as, for example, evidence may be rejected as the result of demonic delusion, yet there are limits to how far a Christian can reasonably (and charitably) pursue this dismissive strategy.  In all this, he urges a posture of “cautious, critical open-mindedness.”

    How a “Ramified Mode of Investigation” Benefits Various Philosophical Projects

    We hope that this special issue of Philosophia Christi helps to clarify the nature and purpose of ramified natural theology.  We believe that ramified natural theology should be of interest to both Christian and non-Christian philosophers and theologians, and those in religious studies and biblical studies.  It is our hope that, soon, ramified natural theology will have a prominent place in any survey of philosophy of religion.  To that end, we edited this volume in order to stimulate further work, whether this involves a defense, critique or proposed improvements of extant arguments, or the creative application of a ramified approach to a neglected source of evidence.  For example, the following is an incomplete list of cases which would benefit from a distinctively ramified mode of investigation (in some cases, excellent, initial forays have been made into these areas):

    1. The problem of evil.
    2. Contemporary miracle claims.
    3. Aesthetics and the imagination as a guide to plausibility and truth.
    4. The psychology and neuroscience of religious experience.
    5. Near-death experiences.
    6. Metaethics and moral ontology.
    7. Revisiting the ontological, cosmological, moral and design arguments from a Christocentric perspective.
    8. The existence of the soul and the mind-body problem.
    9. The nature of information and language.
    10. The ontology of knowledge.
    11. The argument from reason.
    12. The nature of truth.
    13. The status of abstract objects.
    14. Existential angst.

    The promise of the ramified approach suggests that the neglect of natural theology (and apologetics more generally) in many seminaries is founded on an unduly limited perception of the scope of natural theological arguments. So long as “natural theology” is taken to be synonymous with “bare natural theology,” natural theology has limited interest to the theologian because it does not tell us who God is or help us to decide which revelation is correct.  Yet this is precisely the target of ramified natural theology, and increased recognition of this fact should spur seminaries into a reconsideration of the role of natural theology in their curricula.

    In closing, the beauty of a ramified approach to natural theology is that it calls Christians to take seriously scripture’s claim that Christ is present throughout reality, holding all things together (Colossians 1: 15-20).  If we really believe this, then we should expect that a Christocentric (rather than a merely theocentric) mode of inquiry will ultimately be the most rewarding.

    Note: Thanks to Hugh Gauch, Justin McGeary and Daniel Murphy for their comments on two earlier drafts of this introduction. 

    Fall 2013 EPS President’s Update

    Posted on August 5, 2013 by -

    Greetings in the name of our risen Lord!   I would like to take this opportunity to let you know of some very exciting developments in the EPS.

    Last year, the EPS began a fundraising campaign aimed at (among other things) increased international collaboration between societies of Christian philosophers.  Although these efforts are only in their infancy, I am happy to report that they have already borne fruit, and we will be helping four Christian philosophers from Europe to attend our annual meeting in Baltimore.   One of these is the chair of the Philosophy of Religion group of Tyndale Fellowship, Dr. Harry Bunting.  Dr. Bunting and Dr. Daniel Hill, secretary of the group and a lecturer at Liverpool University, have extensive contacts in European philosophy and provided a list of promising young Christian philosophers, from which two outstanding candidates, Joseph Diekemper and Jamie Collin, were selected.  It was my privilege to meet Harry, Daniel, Joseph and Jamie during this year’s Tyndale Fellowship meeting at Wolfson College, Cambridge, July 4th to 6th. How encouraging it was to talk to so many brilliant and promising young scholars, some of them students of such greats as Brian Leftow, E. J. Lowe and Richard Swinburne!  It is our mutual hope that this marks the beginning of an ongoing partnership between Tyndale Fellowship and the EPS.
    Another European connection we hope to cultivate is with the European Leadership Forum.   Several members of the EPS have participated in the ELF, which has tracks in philosophy, apologetics and science.  An important contributor to the ELF is Dr. Ralph Vaags at the University of Agder, Norway, and we are pleased to announce that we will assist his attendance of the Baltimore conference.  These are early days, and I hope to strengthen the connection with ELF during a personal visit next year.
    Of course, we would love to do even more, and it is our hope that next year will see even more international collaboration.   As our culture shows increasing signs of a post-Christian orientation focused on secularism and alternative religions, it is vital that evangelical Christian philosophers take a leadership role in supporting each other’s work for Christ throughout the globe.  In some contexts, the illusion has developed that to be a Christian philosopher is either a curiosity or a danger. Concerted, collaborative efforts and mutual encouragement are therefore vital to show that, on the contrary, Christian philosophy is a growing area of vibrant, rigorous, well-informed inquiry that coherently addresses fundamental questions about what is real, how we know, and how we are called to live.
    Some evidence of this is found in the consistently high quality of articles found in journals of Christian philosophy, including Faith and Philosophy and our own Philosophia Christi.  Regarding the latter, I was very pleased with the most recent special issue on neuroscience and the soul, guest edited by Chad Meister and Charles Taliaferro, which featured excellent articles by household names in the international, Christian philosophy community, and some very stimulating essays pushing us to reconsider standard assumptions and pursue promising new models of the mind-brain connection.  Charles and I also believe you will like the forthcoming Winter 2013 special issue on ramified natural theology, which we hope will spur keen minds into whole new avenues of research.   In tandem with Paul Moser’s emphasis on existential encounter with the claims of Christ, ramified natural theology focuses our argumentation on the case for Christian truth.

    The EPS website has also been flourishing.   Paul Moser’s arresting charge to reform the guild of Christian philosophers has provoked a fascinating series of interchanges on the proper focus of Christian philosophy, the Christ-shaped philosophy project.   J. P. Moreland describes the late, great Dallas Willard as one of Christian philosophy’s five-star generals, and though saddened by the loss I am certain Dallas would approve of the constructive tributes and essays that followed.   New books also abound and the website is a great place to find out about new and forthcoming works.   In addition to our annual meeting, the EPS has several regional meetings, and philosophy students are especially encouraged to take advantage of these to present papers and network with other philosophers.

    Let me close by encouraging all of you to pray for the work of the EPS.  We would love to see as many of you as possible at our annual national meeting in Baltimore, November 19-21.   It is a great delight to have another “five star general” (or field marshal!) Richard Swinburne, as our plenary speaker, and I know from the program committee that the quality of submitted papers has never been so high or so numerous.   I very much look forward to seeing many of you at our annual EPS reception during the conference, and if any of you have ideas about what EPS can do better, do not hesitate to relay them to me.
    Blessings on all of your work for Christ’s kingdom, and hope to see you in November!
    Angus Menuge, Ph.D.

    EPS President

    Special Issue of Philosophia Christi on Ramified Natural Theology: Winter 2013 Issue

    Posted on May 9, 2013 by - Uncategorized

    On Ramified Natural Theology

    Winter 2013 Issue of Philosophia Christi

    Guest Editors: Angus Menuge and Charles Taliaferro

    Assistant Editors: Lydia and Timothy McGrew

    Background: The Project of Ramified Natural Theology

    As usually conceived, natural theology aims to justify belief in the existence of God without relying on the authority of divine revelation. However, even if successful, such a “bare” or “generic” approach fails to discriminate among competing theistic religions. Recently, however, scholars have argued that it is possible to develop natural theological arguments to count decisively in favor of the Christian portrayal of God. This is really a revival and extension of the approach taken by some of the church fathers and Pascal, who emphasized the way the evidence for miracles and fulfilled prophecy favor Christianity over rival religions. Richard Swinburne has dubbed this approach ramified natural theology, and in his The Resurrection of God Incarnate(Oxford, 2003) and other works, he has developed a powerful argument for the truth of Christianity by combining the general background evidence for God’s existence with the prior likelihood of the incarnation and the posterior unlikelihood of our having the evidence we do for the life, death and resurrection of Christ unless those events were the result of God’s plan of salvation. For a potent summary of Swinburne’s case, see his new article, “The Probability of the Resurrection of Jesus.” This article appears in the Winter 2013 issueof Philosophia Christi, and provides the central focus for that issue’s broader discussion of the merits and potential of ramified natural theology.

    Swinburne’s approach is by no means uncontroversial. Some oppose the very idea of natural theology, preferring a presuppositionalist approach. On the other hand, some evidentialists hold that the existence of God can be argued directly from the case for the resurrection without building a prior case for theism. Between these poles there is a spectrum of intermediate positions, some closer to Swinburne’s preferred methodology than others. There are also alternatives to Swinburne’s Bayesian formulation that may be worth exploring.

    One topic deserving critical discussion is the merit of Swinburne’s approach as compared to alternative methodologies. It would also be interesting to consider what impact an expanded notion of natural theology has on the standard distinctions between revealed and natural theology and between natural theology and natural science. Will some of the hard and fast distinctions of the past break down? Should they? An interesting implication of ramified natural theology is that scripture can be used as a source of public evidence without presuming inspiration, so that it functions in a quite different way than it does in systematic theology and dogmatics. However, assuming that some version of ramified natural theology has promise, at least as important as these methodological concerns is a consideration of its scope and proper content: what kinds of evidence can and should be folded into an extended natural theology to make the strongest possible case for the truth of Christianity?

    Topics in Ramified Natural Theology

    To flesh out the possibilities here, consider the following (certainly incomplete) list of topics which might figure in ramified natural theology.
    1. Christian Religious Experience. This is not the standard argument for God based on religious experience but rather the case for Christianity based in part on the particular character of some religious experience. Such experience includes not only personal visions (cf. Phillip Weibe’s Visions of Jesus [Oxford, 1997]), but also church witness (cf. Stanley Hauerwas’ Gifford Addresses inWith the Grain of the Universe [Brazos Press, 2001]).
    2. The Moral Argument for Christianity. The moral argument for God is an important and thriving area of Christian philosophy, but the focus here would be moral arguments, like those of Pascal, which favor a distinctively Christian anthropology and account of God’s saving work.
    3. Fulfilled Bible Prophecy. While not all Bible prophecies meet the stringent demands of public natural theology, it is arguable that some do, and these are enough to mount an important case for the veracity of Christianity. Important work in this area has been done by Hugh Gauch, John Bloom, and Robert Newman (Philosophia Christi 4 (2002):45-88).
    4. The Problem of Evil. Traditional approaches concern the compatibility of a good God with moral and natural evil. However, Eleonore Stump’s approach (in Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering [Oxford, 2010]), treats the narratives about evil in scripture as candidates for an adequate account of evil. And some argue that only an explicitly Christocentric approach is adequate to address the most difficult issues, such as “gratuitous” and “radical” evil.
    5. Natural Theology’s Case for Christ’s Resurrection. This is arguably the supreme topic of ramified natural theology, developed by Swinburne and, in a somewhat different way, by Timothy and Lydia McGrew, in the last chapter of the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Blackwell, 2009). Swinburne’s approach makes the evidence for generic theism crucially relevant to the case for the resurrection whereas it is only indirectly relevant in the argument made by the McGrews. A paper by Hugh Gauch commenting on the differing methodologies of Swinburne and the McGrews appears in the Winter 2011 issue of Philosophia Christi.

    The last topic raises again the whole issue of how we assess promising methodologies for ramified natural theology. Is there one best method, or several approaches which may have value, perhaps depending on the target audience or other worldviews actively in competition with Christianity? Are some methods fatally flawed because they rely on a mistaken anthropology or on inscrutable or inaccessible probabilities? Can defenders of ramified natural theology provide convincing replies to their critics? Are there viable compromise positions that should be explored?