Search Results for: Jerry Walls

Theistic Foundations of Morality: Interview with David Baggett and Jerry Walls

Philosophers David Baggett and Jerry Walls recently released their Oxford University Press book, Good God: Theistic Foundations of Morality. In my interview with them, we discuss the following areas:

  • The uniqueness of their thesis and approach in light of other moral apologetics contributions.
  • Major objections against theistic ethics.
  • What it was like to co-author and attempt to write for a broader audience beyond just for professional philosophers.
  • How their argument attempts to respond to objections from naturalists and “radical voluntarists”
  • How atheism and nihilism are related and unrelated.
  • Why they think a Calvinistic concept of God is problematic for a moral argument for God’s existence.
  • Why they argue for a particular version of voluntarism for understanding moral obligations and divine command theory.
  • How natural moral law theory figures into their discussion.
  • What their discussion contributes to understanding the problem of evil.
  • How distinctive Christian teaching advances and benefits the discussion on “theistic foundations of morality.”
… and so much more (including a sneak-peak at their forthcoming book, where they intend to offer a “full on assault on naturalistic ethics”).
Here is a little excerpt:

Good God pulls together various loose strands (from various perspectives, questions, approaches, thought-influencers) in order to do some work regarding the “theistic foundations of morality.” Whether from older or newer sources, who has provided formidable influence on your thinking in this area?

Baggett and Walls: This is a great question. There’s no doubt but that our work was only made possible by our standing on the shoulders of giants in the field of philosophy. All sorts of classical philosophers could be mentioned whose influence should be obvious, from Plato to Scotus to Descartes to Kant; but allow us to mention some of the more contemporary thinkers whose work has had a huge impact. Robert Adams exerted a formidable influence with his seminal Finite and Infinite Goods and his work on Leibniz. Al Plantinga and Tom Morris immediately come to mind for work they did in the metaphysics of modality and implications of Anselmianism. Phil Quinn, John Hare, and Alasdair MacIntyre leap to mind for their ground-breaking work in ethics. Those are some of the most important thinkers without whose work ours would not have been written.

The two major opponents of your moral apologetics seem to be naturalists and also “radical voluntarists” or “Ockhamists.” Is that right? If so, why these opponents? How are they similar and different in their objections?

Baggett and Walls: Well, we’re certainly attempting to persuade both of these camps that they’re missing something. The radical voluntarists—here we largely defer to tradition by casting them as “Ockhamists”—fall prey to the horn of the Euthyphro Dilemma that would render morality arbitrary and vacuous, a matter of divine caprice. We reject the universal possibilism that such a view entails. Some things God can’t do; the Bible itself says so. God can’t commit suicide, deny himself, lie, or, so we argue, make the torture of children for fun morally right. Such constraints on God are internal to his character and signs of his perfection, not liabilities or threats to his sovereignty. So the voluntarists, we think, are wrong here, because by saying it’s the divine will that ultimately determines moral truth, they lose the capacity to rule some things out by pointing to the perfection of God’s character. In this way we resonate more with Thomists than radical divine command theorists. But we are very open to a properly nuanced variant of divine command ethics that avoids such radical voluntarism.

Naturalists, on the other hand, deny God altogether; but speaking hypothetically, they would likely insist that, if God existed, he would still be irrelevant to ethics because his commands would, at most, clue us in as to what morality says or threaten wrongdoing or promise rewards for good behavior, rather than determining its contents in any sense at all. God might be relevant to ethics epistemologically or prudentially, in other words, but not ontologically. Such categorical nonvoluntarism strikes us, as classical Christians, as fundamentally wrongheaded, because if God exists surely he’s more relevant to ethics than that. Indeed, we argue at length that the evidence would suggest that theism makes considerably better sense of such moral commitments as moral freedom, responsibility, duties, and rights than naturalism can. When atheists insist they believe in these moral facts, we immediately share with them common ground and can generate a good discussion about what best explains such moral truths. This is the beauty of moral arguments for God’s existence: at their best they start with what most people already claim to believe strongly.

 To read the complete text of the interview, please click here

Theistic Foundations of Morality: Interview with Jerry L. Walls

In this wide-ranging interview, Jerry Walls (with co-author David Baggett) discuss many different areas from their 2011 book, Good God: Theistic Foundations of Morality, including:

  • The uniqueness of their thesis and approach in light of other moral apologetics contributions.
  • Major objections against theistic ethics.
  • What it was like to co-author and attempt to write for a broader audience beyond just for professional philosophers.
  • How their argument attempts to respond to objections from naturalists and “radical voluntarists”
  • How atheism and nihilism are related and unrelated.
  • Why they think a Calvinistic concept of God is problematic for a moral argument for God’s existence.
  • Why they argue for a particular version of voluntarism for understanding moral obligations and divine command theory.
  • How natural moral law theory figures into their discussion.
  • What their discussion contributes to understanding the problem of evil.
  • How distinctive Christian teaching advances and benefits the discusion on “theistic foundations of morality.”

… and so much more!

To read the complete text of the interview, please click here.

Addendum: More Rebuttals of Walls from Pharaoh’s Magicians’

This web article is an addendum to the four main arguments presented in our article, “Pharaoh’s Magicians Redivivus: A Response to Jerry Walls on Christian Compatibilism” (Philosophia Christi 17:1 [Summer 2015]).

We have developed fourteen additional arguments that rebut the case Jerry Walls made against compatibilism in “Why No Classical Theist, Let Alone Orthodox Christian, Should Ever Be a Compatibilist” (Philosophia Christi 13:1 [Summer 2011]: 75-104). 

The full-text of this paper is available for FREE by clicking here.

2008 EPS Book Symposium (Habermas, Walls, Baggett, Geivett)

Gary R. Habermas, Jerry L. Walls, Dave Baggett, and R. Douglas Geivett

Book Symposium: C. S. Lewis as Philosopher: Truth, Goodness and Beauty

Abstract: C. S. Lewis as Philosopher: Truth, Goodness, and Beauty is a new book that makes a significant contribution to C. S. Lewis studies and will be of interest to philosophers, aficionados and any who have an interst in the writings of C.S. Lewis. This book is a collection of essays presented at the 2005 C. S. Lewis Oxbridge Conference held jointly at Oxford and Cambridge Universities. Fifteen essays explore three major philosophical themes from the writings of Lewis–Truth, Goodness and Beauty. It provides a comprehensive overview of Lewis’s philosophical thinking on arguments for Christianity, the character of God, theodicy, moral goodness, heaven and hell, a theory of literature and the place of the imagination.

2017: Call for Papers: Southwest Regional EPS

Evangelical Philosophical Society
Call For Papers

THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE EPS SOUTHWEST REGION

“Philosophical Eschatology” 

The Riley Conference Center
Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, Fort Worth, TX
March 31 – April 1 

Keynote Speaker: Jerry Walls

Scholar in Residence and Professor of Philosophy,

Houston Baptist University 

All full members and student members of EPS are invited to submit paper proposals on topics related to this year’s theme, including heaven, hell, purgatory, resurrection, the afterlife, etc. Quality papers on topics not directly related to the theme are also welcome.

Full Members: Paper proposals should include a title and abstract (300 words), the presenter’s name and institutional affiliation, and the presenter’s membership status. An acceptable paper should be delivered in 25 minutes with 5-10 minutes for discussion.

Student Members: In addition to the above requirements, student papers are to be sponsored by a full member of EPS. Proposals should include the student’s degree program and email confirmation from the sponsor who has agreed to oversee the paper’s preparation.

All paper proposals should be submitted to benarbour03@yahoo.com

The submission deadline is February 13, 2017.

 Student Paper Competition: Student members whose papers are accepted for inclusion in the program will be eligible to enter a student paper competition. Students who wish to enter the competition must submit the following to Greg Trickett at gtrickett@wc.edu by March 3, 2017:
  1. A titled, full version of the paper to be presented suitable for blind review.
  2. A 200-300 word abstract with the paper title as it appears on the blind review submission, the student’s name, pursued degree, and societal and institutional affiliations.
Winner(s) will be announced at the final plenary session of the conference. Students must present their papers at the conference to be considered for the competition.
 
Tawa Anderson, Chair, tawa.anderson@okbu.edu (405) 585-4437

Ben Arbour, Program Chair, benarbour03@yahoo.com (979) 574-1300

Joshua Farris, Secretary, jfarris@hbu.edu (281) 649-3214 

Why No Classical Theist, Let Alone Orthodox Christian, Should Ever be a Compatibilist

This Philosophia Christi article argues that no classical theist, and even more no orthodox Christian, should affirm compatibilism in our world. However plausible compatibilism may be on atheistic assumptions, bringing God into the equation should radically alter our judgment on this ongoing controversy.

In particular, if freedom and determinism are compatible, then God could have created a world in which all persons freely did only the good at all times. Given this implication of compatibilism, three issues that are already challenging become extraordinarily more difficult, if not insuperable, namely: moral responsibility, the problem of evil, and the orthodox doctrine of eternal damnation.

The full-text of this article is available for FREE by clicking here. The article originally appeared in the Summer 2011 issue of Philosophia Christi.

Theistic Foundations of Morality: Interview with David Baggett

In this wide-ranging interview, David Baggett (with co-author Jerry Walls) discuss many different areas from their 2011 book, Good God: Theistic Foundations of Morality, including:

  • The uniqueness of their thesis and approach in light of other moral apologetics contributions.
  • Major objections against theistic ethics.
  • What it was like to co-author and attempt to write for a broader audience beyond just for professional philosophers.
  • How their argument attempts to respond to objections from naturalists and “radical voluntarists”
  • How atheism and nihilism are related and unrelated.
  • Why they think a Calvinistic concept of God is problematic for a moral argument for God’s existence.
  • Why they argue for a particular version of voluntarism for understanding moral obligations and divine command theory.
  • How natural moral law theory figures into their discussion.
  • What their discussion contributes to understanding the problem of evil.
  • How distinctive Christian teaching advances and benefits the discusion on “theistic foundations of morality.”

… and so much more!

To read the complete text of the interview, please click here.

Free Will and the Stages of Theological Anthropology

Learn more about this Routledge Research Companion to Theological Anthropology and this chapter contribution!

The principal object of this chapter is to explore the role of free will in the context of theological anthropology. Specifically, we address the relation of human freedom to the progression through the various stages of theological anthropology: status integritatis, status corruptionis, and status gloriae. We begin by contrasting compatibilism and incompatibilism and their respective abilities to account from human freedom. In the theological realm, compatibilism states that human’s action may be freely chosen even if God also determines that same act. In contrast, incompatibilism claims that the existence of free will is incompatible with determinism.

The first stage of theological anthropology that we address is status integritatis. This is the state of humans before sin. Because they are created in the image of God, they are moral agents and, as such, have free will. Traditional Christian thought has held that freedom in this stage is a two-way power; it can be used either in alignment with God’s will, or against it. One approach to an incompatibilist account of human freedom is as follows. For God to create a universe that contained moral good, he would have to create that universe with the possibility for moral evil as well. Because God does not, according to the incompatibilist’s view, determine how agents use their free will, sin becomes a possibility if he gives creation free will. However, because those agents have not lost original righteousness (because they have not yet sinned), it is also possible for them to not sin. Compatibilists often explain human sin, given that God could have determined that humans never freely sin, by using a version of the greater good defense. Here, sin is necessary for some greater good (e.g., incarnation, atonement). On this view, God determines agents to sin in order to bring about that greater good.

Like the status integritatis, in the status corruptionis, humans have the ability to sin. This state comes, however, after the loss of original righteousness. As such, human agents in this stage are no longer oriented toward the good of alignment with God and are in bondage to sin and death. As such, without some grace beyond the grace of nature, humans in the status corruptionis are unable to freely choose the good. Christian tradition supports the claim that free agents in this stage cannot initiate movement toward the good of alignment with God. Instead, God must bestow a unique grace upon the agent in order for that agent to choose a good. In both compatibilist and incompatibilist views, the ability to sin in the status corruptionis has the same provenance as it does in the status integritatis. Compatibilism has an easier time explaining how humans can freely make or fail to make a choice, since it allows God to determine them without undermining their freedom. But, we argue, even on a libertarian account of free will, there is nothing that prevents agents from being both freely able to sin and not freely able to choose the good. Because of the impact of sin upon the individual, a unique grace will be needed for the agent to will the good.

The final stage of theological anthropology is the status gloriae, the stage in which the redeemed are unable to sin. The truth of compatibilism would again allow for an easy defense of this stage: if God can determine how agents use their free will, then God can determine that the redeemed in heaven only direct their free will toward the good and never sin. Incompatibilism seems to have a harder time accounting for the status gloriae: if the redeemed are unable to sin, it would seem that their free will is constrained in some important way. We suggest that one possible libertarian approach is to argue for the agent’s own moral character being the constraining factor. As long as that agent’s moral character is freely formed, and thus an internal rather than external constraint, it need not count against her being free. The libertarian can also argue that a person is only free to choose some option if she sees a reason to choose that option. On this view, the redeemed would have perfected their character so that they perfectly understand their reasons for acting (and not acting), can weigh those reasons perfectly, and would never act contrary to those reasons. It would be possible, then, that the redeemed see no reason to sin, and thus cannot freely choose to sin.

Many of these issues are treated at greater length in Timpe’s Free Will in Philosophical Theology (Bloomsbury 2013). Those interested in these issues should also look at Stewart Goetz’s Freedom, Teleology, and Evil (Continuum 2011). There are considerable literatures relating human freedom to heaven and hell; perhaps the best place to start is Jerry Walls’ Heaven, Hell, and Purgatory: Rethinking the Things that Matter Most (Brazos 2015). We hope that further work will explore philosophical issues of the Incarnation for how it relates to human freedom, as well as the related issue of deification that one finds in various Christian traditions.

Web Project: Philosophical Discussions on Marriage and Family Topics

Instructions for Submitting a Paper Proposal

Purpose: For scholars interested in ethics, theology, and philosophy work on ‘marriage and family’ topics, we invite carefully-honed papers that advances discussion of any of the below areas of the Potential Paper Topics.

If you are interested, please contact our project coordinator and editor Michael Austin (info below). Michael is seeking to coordinate all potential contributors and their topics for this endeavor. When you pitch your possible contribution, please provide the following:

  • Your name, institution and contact info.
  • Title and description of your proposal (e.g., 100 words).
  • Reasons for how your contribution will help advance the purpose of this project.

We are looking for papers that a) argue for a perspective on a marriage and family topic, or b) casts a vision for more work to be done in a particular area or c) offers a literature review and assess what seems to be ‘under-developed’ work.

Length: 1,500 to 2,000 total words (minimum). You are welcome to work with the Project Editor on length issues.

Deadline: TBD by the project coordinator

Project Coordinator and Editor
Michael Austin
Eastern Kentucky University
Department of Philosophy
mike.austin@eku.edu

Priority will be given to those papers that offer a perspective on questions and problems that especially hone in on what have been ‘under-represented’ in this theme for Christian philosophers. Please seriously consider developing paper topics with the below examples in mind. We encourage papers that will be of interest not only to the ethics scholar but also to the epistemologist, metaphysician, theologian, etc.

Contributions


Find this Project interesting? See these other EPS Web Projects


Potential Paper Topics

Developed by Michael Austin (Eastern Kentucky University) & Joe Gorra (Veritas Life Center).

Much has been addressed by Christian philosophers on questions related to bioethics, reproductive technologies, and so on. But some under-represented ‘marriage and family’ topics include the following:

Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Issues in Marriage and Family Studies: If philosophy and theology are understood as ‘second-order’ disciplines, how might they contribute to the work and contributions of ‘first-order’ disciplines like sociology, psychology, economics, cultural studies and their accounts of marriage and family? How might ideas and images shaped by these disciplines enable and clarify the work done by philosophers and theologians? We strongly encourage contributions from Christian philosophers who have understanding of the ‘meta-‘ issues involved with philosophy’s contribution to interdisciplinary discussions. We also encourage Christian non-philosophers to propose papers that are attentive to philosophical issues and concepts that converge with their discipline and areas of expertise. Co-authored proposals from philosophy and non-philosophy scholars are welcomed.

Papers may wish to interact with this literature:

Ethics of religious upbringing of children: how to share, model, and influence our children for Christ in ways that honor God and respect them as well. Defenses of the morality of a Christian upbringing in the face of challenges at a popular level (e.g. Dawkins and “child abuse” claims) as well as at the scholarly level. How might philosophical accounts of ‘harm’ and ‘interest’ (of children, parents, etc) contribute to clarifying what is often a legally vague idea of ‘Acting in the best interests of the child.’

Papers may wish to interact with this literature:

Metaphysics of the Family: What is a family? What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a family, on Christian theism? What biblical, theological, and philosophical data are relevant to this question? How important is genetics or biology to this definition? Or what value is there with respect to a biological connection of some sort between parent and child? Who is a father or a mother? How might a vocational account differ from strictly a biological account? How might we reflect upon ‘step-parenting,’ ‘foster-care parenting’ and ‘surrogate parenting’ in light of Christian theological accounts of adoption and hospitality of God? How might we think about the nature of parenting and family in light of the genetic modification of children and the technological possibilities of creating babies from three or more parents? And what implications do our answers to these questions have for the current cultural debates about same-sex marriage and same-sex parenting? From a political philosophy standpoint, what are strong, non-religious arguments for why a ‘secular state’ has an interest in protecting the family?

Papers may wish to interact with this literature:

Metaphysical and Epistemological issues in Gender, Sexuality and Identity: What are necessary and sufficient conditions for defining ‘gender,’ ‘sexuality’ and ‘human identity’? On what basis are such distinctions drawn? In what sense and on what basis are these terms considered social constructions? ‘Self-identification’ of one’s experience as x, y, or z often populates studies in this area. Is this knowledge from a first-person perspective? Is it simply one’s construal? How might we understand the ‘authority’ of such claims relative to the authority of tradition, history, social institutions, etc.

Papers may wish to interact with this literature:

Moral-Spiritual Formation of the Family: How does this occur, for both parents and children? What theological and philosophical resources can we bring to bear on this? How can parents be intentional about such formation for themselves and their children in the family? What does the Bible have to say that is relevant to such questions? And what do psychology, sociology, and other disciplines have to contribute to this? Is virtue formation and spiritual maturation in a family interconnected with being the roles of a mother and a father? What is the role of ecclesial communities in such matters of formation? Does the ‘Christian family’ exist primarily for the interests of the ‘household of faith’?

Papers may wish to interact with this literature:

  • For ‘ethics and family’ treatments, see Julie Rubio, Family Ethics: Practices for Christians (Georgetown University Press, 2010); Michael W. Austin, Wise Stewards: Philosophical Foundations of Christian Parenting (Kregel Academic, 2009).
  • For some work on the vocation of the family, see Gene Edward Veith and Mary J. Moerbe, Family Vocation (Crossway, 2012).
  • For recent article examples on philosophy and spiritual formation integration, see from the (Fall 2014) Journal of Spiritual Formation and Soul Care, Steve Porter, “A Call to Philosophy and Spiritual Formation” (248-257), and “Philosophy and Spiritual Formation: From Christian Faith to Christian Philosophy” (258-269); and also from JSFSC’s (Spring 2014), see Brian Brock, “Discipleship as Living with God, or Wayfinding and Scripture,” 22-34.

Non-Religious Arguments for Marriage and the Family: What are the opportunities and limitations for using ‘natural moral law arguments’ in public and pluralistic contexts? Are such arguments mostly useful for ‘consoling the faithful’? How are ‘secularists’ compelled by such arguments, if they are compelled at all? How might such arguments be retooled in light of changing plausibility structures in Western societies, which increasingly view Christian accounts of marriage and family to be contestable and not believable? How might sociological, psychological and economic reasons and evidences be more persuasive to most secularists than natural law arguments?

Papers may wish to interact with this literature:

Moral Vision of Flourishing ‘Families’ in a Pluralistic Society: Culturally speaking, the experience of marriage and family is no longer a homogenous kind of experience in Western societies. Increasingly, we have ‘pluralist’ accounts recognized by law, legitimized by cultural pressures, and encouraged by various social institutions.

Drawing from Christian Social Thought, how might Christians envision a society that attends to our differences, even contradictions, regarding marriage and family flourishing? Is such a society possible? What conditions or values should shape how we are bound together? How might Christians think societally about such issues like ‘gay adoption,’ government assistance for unwed mothers, illegal immigration and deportation of parents, youth incarceration and single-parent homes, etc? What society should be built by Christian thought and leadership influence given the particularities of our cultural moment? We encourage constructive responses that seek to minister to each person made in the image of God, and seeks to uphold the social order.

Papers may wish to interact with this literature:

‘Health,’ ‘Well-Being,’ and ‘Holiness’ of Marriage and Family: Innumerable scientific studies have been written about the health and happiness of individuals, their family and affects on society. ‘Health,’ though, is usually given a reductive account: a scientific or medical question about an organism. Similarly, ‘happiness studies’ usually assume a psychological account about someone’s mental outlook on life. Is there a thicker account of ‘health’ and ‘well-being’ that includes but is not reduced to the hard or soft sciences? Moreover, Christians have historically understood marriage and family as sacred or holy, set apart for the glory and purposes of God’s work in the world. Is there ‘health’ and ‘well-being’ entailed by that sacred, perhaps even ‘sacramental vision’ of marriage and family? How might we recapture a more holistic understanding of eudaimonia as a collective, relational phenomenon, in family, church and state.

Papers may wish to interact with this literature:


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