Search Results for: Timothy McGrew

Four Views on Christianity and Philosophy

Philosophy and Christianity make truth claims about many of the same things. For example, they both claim to provide answers to the deep questions of life.

In Four Views on Christianity and Philosophy (Zondervan, 2016), EPS members, Paul M. Gould and Richard B. Davis, edit, compile and introduce interactions on four predominant views about the relationship between philosophy and the Christian worldview and their implications for life and practices.

The contributors and four views include:

Each author identifies the propositional relation between philosophy and Christianity along with a section devoted to the implications for living a life devoted to the pursuit of wisdom. One of the benefits of this book is the point-counterpoint responses and replies among proponents of each view.

In their resourceful introduction, Paul Gould and Rich Davis explain the background to this “four views” discussion and provide some historical background, as well as helpful summaries of each position in the conclusion.

In the reader-friendly, Zondervan Counterpoints format, this book helps readers to reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of each view and draw informed conclusions in this much-debated topic.

Gould and Davis present their co-edited volume with the intent to help resource and encourage professors, students, pastors and other Christian leaders.

Their own “advice to students” embodies the ideals of this book. How might one think about going into philosophy?

Follow on Twitter news about the book by going to @FourViewsCPhil. Follow also co-editors Gould @PaulMGould and Davis @RBrDavis.

Readers may also enjoy the following other projects and resources provided by the Evangelical Philosophical Society:

Convergence: Philosophy Confirms Christianity

Learn more about the Four Views on Christianity and Philosophy (Zondervan, 2016) by going to the EPS book page.

In my contributions to this volume, I argue for two central claims: that we can (and ought to) observe the same standards of evidence in questions about Christianity that we would (and ought to) observe in any other historical inquiry; and that if we do, we will find in the end that the public evidence for Christianity points to something fully compatible with our best philosophical reasoning.

The other contributors disagree. Oppy thinks that the public evidence points instead toward naturalism; Moser dismisses appeals the public evidence, which in his view does not yield any significant reason to believe in a God worthy of worship, in favor of a personal existential encounter; and Oliphint denies that anyone except a Christian can evaluate the evidence rightly.

Each of them is, I think, responding to something right. To Oppy I would grant that some pieces of public evidence, considered in isolation or viewed in soft focus, point toward naturalism. But our responsibility is not to jump to a conclusion on the basis of a casual glance at part of the available evidence; it is to arrive at the best conclusions we can based on a careful consideration of all of the evidence available. And that evidence is very rich, much richer than most skeptics or even most Christians commonly believe.

I certainly agree with Moser that Christianity involves more than a mere intellectual assent to propositions. One need have no very deep acquaintance with the New Testament to realize that Christians are called to a relationship with their Creator. But an intense private religious experience is something else. It is rather like the white stone mentioned in Revelation that has a new name written that no man knows except the one who receives it. Moser seems to think that such experiences are normative for all Christians. I cannot agree with him here. And speaking as someone who has never had such an experience, I am grateful for the abundance of public evidence, evidence that I believe Moser severely underestimates.

Not everyone is willing, of course, to look at the evidence and draw the appropriate conclusions. All of us have preferences, preconceptions, and aversions that tend to color our evaluation of evidence, and those biases are particularly apt to crowd in on us when we are trying to consider religious questions. If Oliphint were content to draw our attention to this point as a difficulty, I would heartily agree with him. But in my opinion he exaggerates this very real difficulty into an impossibility. And here I am faced with a curious irony. I believe that the evidence both of philosophical reflection and of proper biblical exegesis strongly favors the evidentialist position that I espouse. In particular, I believe that many people are able, with good will and without first capitulating on the substantive issues, to see past the biases they bring to disputed questions and acknowledge the weight of the evidence. I aspire to be such a person myself. And I should very much like to persuade Oliphint on this point. But his persistence in his own position strikes me as an instance of the sort of evidential intransigence that he attributes to all non-Christians.

In my contributions to this volume I have tried to outline some neglected lines of evidence and argument. I hope that interested readers will follow up on the references I have given, as I am persuaded that they are all worthy of serious investigation. Rather than restate those suggestions, I want here to highlight a few points that seem often to be misunderstood or misevaluated.

Most of the arguments that I find persuasive are either broadly inductive or else make use of uncertain premises that stand themselves in need of empirical support. In approaching the matter this way, I am deliberately stepping away from one tradition in natural theology according to which arguments for the existence of God are deductive in form and proceed from premises that are either intuitively or demonstratively certain. That tradition has able advocates, and I am not interested in criticizing it. My objective here, however, has been to exhibit the kind of arguments that I find most persuasive. Those arguments form what is commonly known as a cumulative case.

A consequence of this approach is that the individual arguments may not be designed to establish, by themselves, the full range of the divine attributes or even a subset that would guarantee that there is a God worthy of worship. Moser, in particular, thinks this is a grave problem with a cumulative case of the kind I have sketched. So do many skeptics. But sometimes they reconsider and withdraw the criticism. Joseph Barker, a prominent Victorian freethinker who underwent a crisis of doubt and returned to the Christian faith, said after his reconversion that in hindsight he saw the design argument as a stepping stone to belief in the Christian God – one that he had, as a skeptic, irrationally refused to use. I think the metaphor is a good one. Most of these arguments are stepping stones, available for those who are willing to use them, and are none the worse for their playing such a modest role in the overall case. This is, after all, the way in which we unhesitatingly reason in everyday life. We seek explanations, put together varied pieces of information, and make use of overlapping non-deductive inferences. It would be odd if such reasoning were subject to some special sort of problems just here but not elsewhere.

Some people are worried by an evidential approach because they think that, judged by such a standard, most ordinary people are not justified in their religious beliefs. I have some sympathy with those who have this worry. Many theists (including some who are professional philosophers) could have better reasons than they in fact do for believing in God. On the other hand, I am not nearly as pessimistic about the average believer’s epistemic state as some critics seem to think an evidentialist should be. Take, for example, the question of the trustworthiness of the Gospels. There are many marks of authenticity and touches of realism in them that frequently do – and should – elicit even a casual reader’s assent. The transparent candor with which the writers record embarrassing details about the apostles (see, for example, the boastfulness of the disciples in Mark 14:31, their cowardice in Mark 14:50, their stupidity in Mark 6:52, their incompetence in Mark 9:18, and their absence without leave at the empty tomb in Mark 16:1-8) is one of these touches. The inclusion of unexplained allusions (such as Jesus’ use of the term “Boanerges” in Mark 3:17) is another. Ordinary readers without special philosophical or philological training are quite competent to pick up on such marks of authenticity. They may well be reasonable in sticking to their convictions even if they are somewhat inarticulate when pressed for the grounds of those beliefs.

I have less sympathy for those who criticize the evidential approach from a theological standpoint. Though the Bible offers us salutary warnings about the dangers of an overweening confidence in our own intellectual abilities or the scope of our knowledge, neither Scripture nor a sound systematic theology affords the slightest ground for despising reason itself. And this is as it should be. For without reason, we would be at a loss to adjudicate the competing claims of proposed revelations.

Even to talk of adjudicating such claims is to run afoul of some theological critics who object that it is blasphemous to speak of judging the Word of God when we should rather say that the Word judges us. But this is at best a mere play on words. When we are rightly persuaded that a revelation has come from God, we are indeed in no position to pass judgment on the Almighty. But we have both the right and the responsibility to examine carefully the credentials of a proposed revelation, lest we should embrace a clever fraud. Piety is a vital thing in its proper place and directed toward its proper object. But it is not a substitute for technique.

Special Invitation from Ratio Christi

RatioChristi.org

All current EPS members are encouraged to collaborate with Ratio Christi, a student apologetics alliance, in light of this invitation from president Corey Miller:

Ratio Christi is eager to open the door to various EPS members to speak at our more than 150 university chapters via our Speakers Bureau, to consider being a faculty advisor or even starting a Ratio Christi chapter at your university (even if you’re a professor), and also to encourage those current and future professors at secular universities by providing resources for faculty ministry as winsome and productive but bold and shrewd “missional professors.” We wish to subvert the notion of an occupation in favor of a vocation such that professors do not see it as a job but as a calling and think creatively toward what that might look like for each individual. We provide resources and details including PROF Talks videos that are by professors for professors in secular universities that prove helpful in understanding what it might look like to be missional in that environment and academic discipline. We welcome those who wish to cooperate with us for the benefit of all in making more of these videos so that we have one in every academic discipline. We envision a movement of missional professors such that every student knows at least one of them and so that every academic discipline has a core group of Christian scholars working together to rebuild the plausibility structure of the Christian world and life view on secular campuses. 

For more information, see www.ratiochristi.com/prof.

See also recent books by Ratio Christi associates, including Corey Miller and Paul Gould’s book Is Faith in God Reasonable? Debates in Philosophy, Science, and Rhetoric (Routledge, 2014), which was based on a William Lane Craig Alex Rosenberg debate at Purdue; it includes entries by Victor Stenger, Paul Moser, Timothy McGrew, Robert Kaita, Michael Ruse, etc. For those interested in apologetics ministry and leadership, Mike Sherrards, Relational Apologetics: Defending the Faith with Holiness Respect and Truth (Kregel, 2015).

Finally, do not miss their upcoming symposium on February 5-7, 2016:

Introduction to a Special Issue of Philosophia Christi on Ramified Natural Theology

Extended Discussions of Ramified Natural Theology

In light of the Philosophia Christi (Winter 2013) themed discussion on “Ramified,” we welcome ongoing web contributions directly related to the Philosophia Christi articles or as fresh additions to that discussion. For example, consider these worthwhile papers:
For more interactive discussions on “Ramified Natural Theology” and “Christ-Shaped Philosophy,” see the various papers at this associated web project.

A Renaissance of “Traditional Natural Theology”

What may be called “traditional natural theology” is widely understood as the project of establishing the existence of God and at least some of His attributes through the testimony of the senses and reason, without relying on the authority of divine revelation. Some believe traditional natural theology was dealt a mortal blow by David Hume, Immanuel Kant and other Enlightenment thinkers. To the contrary, it has undergone a startling renaissance, as evidenced by many fine volumes in recent years.

(One could easily cite a large number of  more specialized works devoted to updated versions of the ontological, cosmological, teleological and moral arguments as well as the arguments from reason, consciousness and abstract objects).

Beyond Natural Theology’s “Generic Theism”

However, even if successful, the arguments of traditional natural theology can hope at best to establish a “bare” or “generic” theism: they cannot tell us which of the competing theistic religions is most likely true. The received wisdom is that further illumination about the identity of God is only available through special revelation. This assumption is challenged by an approach that Richard Swinburne has dubbed “ramified natural theology” [Richard Swinburne, “Natural Theology, Its ‘Dwindling Probabilities’ and ‘Lack of Rapport,’” Faith and Philosophy 21(4): 533-546 (2004)]. The idea is to present public evidence which discriminates between competing theistic religions because they do not all explain that evidence, or explain it equally well. While Swinburne is the most famous contemporary proponent of this approach, it has many precedents, for example in the arguments of various church fathers and of Blaise Pascal that Christianity is the true theistic religion because of its uniquely strong support by well-attested miracles and fulfilled prophecy. And Alister McGrath’s recent work may also qualify, as he develops an approach to natural theology which is both Christocentric and anchored in specifically Trinitarian theology [Alister McGrath, The Open Secret: A New Vision for Natural Theology (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008). What is controversial in McGrath’s approach is his contention that nature must be interpreted in an appropriate way to disclose its secrets: will this depend on presuppositions that are not neutral between competing worldviews?]

The Promise of “Ramified Natural Theology”

The promise of ramified natural theology is considerable.   On the one hand, as developed by Swinburne, ramified natural theology is an extension of traditional natural theology [Richard Swinburne, The Resurrection of God Incarnate (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) and Was Jesus God? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010)].  Thus Swinburne’s case for the truth of Christianity assumes the general background evidence for God’s existence (which he himself has developed in a powerful cumulative case argument), and supplements it with the evidence for the prior likelihood of the incarnation and the posterior unlikelihood of our having the evidence we do for the life, death and resurrection of Christ unless these events were the result of God’s plan of salvation [see Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, second edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004)].  On the other hand, it is by no means obvious that a ramified approach must build on evidence from traditional natural theology.  At least in some cases, a ramified argument may be made independently of a prior case for theism.  For example, as Hugh Gauch has pointed out, in the case for the resurrection developed by Timothy and Lydia McGrew, only Bayes factors are used, dispensing with prior probabilities.  More generally, using a likelihood approach, it is possible to assess the relative merits of a range of competing worldviews without presupposing any of them [see Hugh G. Gauch, Jr. “Natural Theology’s Case for Jesus’s Resurrection:  Methodological and Statistical Considerations,” Philosophia Christi 13 (2011):  339–55; Timothy McGrew and Lydia McGrew, “The Argument from Miracles:  A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, ed. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (West Sussex:  Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 593–662].

To the extent that practitioners of ramified natural theology are sanguine about traditional natural theology, they can exploit the latter’s strengths by developing arguments that extend or supplement its results.  At the same time, to the extent that a ramified natural theological argument is developed independently of traditional natural theology, reservations about the latter do not justify a failure to seriously consider the former [In a recent symposium on Paul K. Moser’s religious epistemology, Moser expressed his skepticism toward the value of traditional natural theological arguments, while Kathryn Waidler, Charles Taliaferro and Harold Netland defended it, but ramified natural theology did not surface. See Philosophia Christi 14 (2) (2012), 263-311].   Ramified natural theology’s flexible relationship with traditional natural theology gives Christian apologists valuable latitude when seeking to address the diverse epistemic states of unbelievers.  For hard-nosed materialists, traditional natural theology may help provide a theistic foundation so that a case for the resurrection (or miracles in general) has more appeal.  But for many others, for whom theistic religions are among the live hypotheses, a ramified approach may be sufficient by itself to select the best worldview option.  There are many new questions and exciting opportunities in this growing area, and we are confident that the nine following essays will help to develop a sense of the potential for ramified natural theology to transform Christian philosophy and apologetics.

The Winter 2013 “Ramified Natural Theology” Issue of Philosophia Christi

The lead article by Richard Swinburne and the subsequent discussion in the next two articles concern Jesus’s resurrection.  Swinburne’s initial essay summarizes several of his book length studies and serves as a paradigm case of ramified natural theology.  Using a Bayesian formulation, Swinburne shows that there is one and only one individual—Jesus of Nazareth—who plausibly satisfies both the prior and the posterior requirements to be God incarnate, and that since the evidence for this is so strong, God would have to be a grand deceiver (or one who permits some lesser agent, such as the devil, to perpetrate grand deception) if some other past or future figure were the messiah, but this is incompatible with God’s perfect moral character.

This last claim of Swinburne’s is the target of the next paper, by Robert Cavin and Carlos Colombetti.  The authors claim that Swinburne’s argument does not satisfy the demand for total evidence, because it overlooks the evidence for intentional human deception by false prophets (and self-deception) on a massive scale.  Given their disagreements about which revelation is authentic, it is arguable that either Christians or non-Christians must have been deceived in some sense. Cavin and Colombetti conclude, contra Swinburne, that it is not improbable that the evidence for the Incarnation and Resurrection is mistaken or misleading.

In his response, Swinburne provides a close study of different kinds of deception, and argues that Cavin and Colombetti conflate God’s unjustifiable permission of deliberate deception with His allowing people to hold false beliefs or to be deceived in justifiable ways.  He claims that the examples provided by Cavin and Colombetti fall into the latter category, and that this is compatible with God’s moral perfection. This exchange is likely only the beginning of an important dialogue on the evidential impact of “negative theology” on the project of ramified natural theology.

While this project is vitally important to Christian philosophers and apologists, is it something theologians proper should take seriously?  Rodney Holder provides several reasons for an affirmative answer.  The first is premised on the fact of religious pluralism: the many competing religions all provide internal criteria for the correctness of their beliefs, but these do not give the outsider an independent means of deciding which revelation is most likely true.  Drawing on the work of Wolfhart Pannenberg, Brian Hebblethwaite and others, Holder argues that theologians need ramified natural theology to overcome this impasse.  They also need it to avoid circular presuppositionalism and to show that Christians have a faith founded on historical fact.  As Holder concludes, “the traditional division between natural theology and revealed theology breaks down as soon as we ask why we should believe in a putative revelation and how we can commend our own perceived revelation to others.”

Some may suspect that ramified natural theology employs an ad hoc procedure of argumentation, gerrymandered by religious apologists to show their faith in the best light.  To the contrary, Hugh Gauch argues that like natural science, ramified natural theology functions with the most basic presuppositions of empirical method required to gain factual information about the world.  Since these presuppositions are held in common between parties in disagreement, and since only public evidence and standard logic is permitted, ramified arguments are capable of objectively discriminating between worldviews.  Sound methodology is vital because, Gauch argues, “Any success and significance that ramified natural theology may have originates in, and depends on, its methodology being clear, impartial, settled, and effective.”  Gauch shows in particular that this approach is ideal for investigating the facticity of miracle claims.  Reinforcing Holder’s assessment, Gauch suggests that natural and revealed theology are not competitors but partners in a fruitful synergy.

One of the extraordinary differences between contemporary natural theology and the natural theology of previous centuries is the former’s integration of the rigorous formalisms of deductive logic and probability theory.  Timothy McGrew and John DePoe seek to show how these technical breakthroughs provide sometimes surprising insights into what does and does not count as a strong argument of natural theology.   On the cautionary side, they show that common intuitions about the probability of deductive arguments are often wrong.  Yet they also show that an important implication of Bayes’ theorem for ramified natural theology is that the combination of many individually weak pieces of evidence can yield a cumulative case argument of great certainty.  They further point out that there are many possible goals of natural theological arguments, and that the value of the argument will often depend on the epistemic state of its audience.

The remaining articles illustrate the wide range of potential application for a ramified approach to natural theology.

Lydia McGrew uses a Bayesian approach to show that Jesus was the prophesied Messiah. Her argument nicely illustrates the fact that even if each piece of evidence raises the probability of a hypothesis by a modest amount, their combination can yield a powerful cumulative case argument.  She further argues that if we consider the remarkable fact that this Messiah is prophesied both to die and also to have a glorious future, the resurrection is much more probable.  This essay thus provides some further support for Swinburne’s conclusion that Jesus was God incarnate and was raised from the dead.

The moral argument for God is a staple of natural theology and many have undertaken to establish the existence of a good God from the apparent facts of moral obligation.  In their paper, David Baggett and Ronnie Campbell seek to extend this argument by showing how Christianity provides superior resources to account for what it means to be a good God, particularly if it has been shown that such a being must be essentially loving.  This is because the Trinity does real explanatory work in showing us what it means for God to be loving in His own nature.  The authors point out that not only does this approach favor Christianity over non-Christian theistic religions, it also provides a reason to prefer some denominations over others on account of their portrait of God’s character.  They dub this intra-Christian inquiry “doubly ramified natural theology.”   This matters not only to the Christian seeking the true church, but also has an impact on non-Christians, as they may reject the faith because some denominations offer a distorted picture of what God is like.

In a similar vein, Travis Dumsday argues that once we consider evidence such as visions and miracles which may favor Christianity over its rivals, it is an unavoidable possibility that some of this evidence will favor some denominations over others.  Dumsday argues that ramified natural theology is, in any case, already at work in interdenominational debate, since philosophical and historical arguments are used to defend or critique confessional positions e.g. on baptism, predestination and whether scripture can coherently be claimed as the sole source and norm of Christian doctrine.  Dumsday points out that these arguments are typically not decisive as, for example, evidence may be rejected as the result of demonic delusion, yet there are limits to how far a Christian can reasonably (and charitably) pursue this dismissive strategy.  In all this, he urges a posture of “cautious, critical open-mindedness.”

How a “Ramified Mode of Investigation” Benefits Various Philosophical Projects

We hope that this special issue of Philosophia Christi helps to clarify the nature and purpose of ramified natural theology.  We believe that ramified natural theology should be of interest to both Christian and non-Christian philosophers and theologians, and those in religious studies and biblical studies.  It is our hope that, soon, ramified natural theology will have a prominent place in any survey of philosophy of religion.  To that end, we edited this volume in order to stimulate further work, whether this involves a defense, critique or proposed improvements of extant arguments, or the creative application of a ramified approach to a neglected source of evidence.  For example, the following is an incomplete list of cases which would benefit from a distinctively ramified mode of investigation (in some cases, excellent, initial forays have been made into these areas):

  1. The problem of evil.
  2. Contemporary miracle claims.
  3. Aesthetics and the imagination as a guide to plausibility and truth.
  4. The psychology and neuroscience of religious experience.
  5. Near-death experiences.
  6. Metaethics and moral ontology.
  7. Revisiting the ontological, cosmological, moral and design arguments from a Christocentric perspective.
  8. The existence of the soul and the mind-body problem.
  9. The nature of information and language.
  10. The ontology of knowledge.
  11. The argument from reason.
  12. The nature of truth.
  13. The status of abstract objects.
  14. Existential angst.

The promise of the ramified approach suggests that the neglect of natural theology (and apologetics more generally) in many seminaries is founded on an unduly limited perception of the scope of natural theological arguments. So long as “natural theology” is taken to be synonymous with “bare natural theology,” natural theology has limited interest to the theologian because it does not tell us who God is or help us to decide which revelation is correct.  Yet this is precisely the target of ramified natural theology, and increased recognition of this fact should spur seminaries into a reconsideration of the role of natural theology in their curricula.

In closing, the beauty of a ramified approach to natural theology is that it calls Christians to take seriously scripture’s claim that Christ is present throughout reality, holding all things together (Colossians 1: 15-20).  If we really believe this, then we should expect that a Christocentric (rather than a merely theocentric) mode of inquiry will ultimately be the most rewarding.

Note: Thanks to Hugh Gauch, Justin McGeary and Daniel Murphy for their comments on two earlier drafts of this introduction. 

Special Issue of Philosophia Christi on Ramified Natural Theology: Winter 2013 Issue

On Ramified Natural Theology

Winter 2013 Issue of Philosophia Christi

Guest Editors: Angus Menuge and Charles Taliaferro

Assistant Editors: Lydia and Timothy McGrew

Background: The Project of Ramified Natural Theology

As usually conceived, natural theology aims to justify belief in the existence of God without relying on the authority of divine revelation. However, even if successful, such a “bare” or “generic” approach fails to discriminate among competing theistic religions. Recently, however, scholars have argued that it is possible to develop natural theological arguments to count decisively in favor of the Christian portrayal of God. This is really a revival and extension of the approach taken by some of the church fathers and Pascal, who emphasized the way the evidence for miracles and fulfilled prophecy favor Christianity over rival religions. Richard Swinburne has dubbed this approach ramified natural theology, and in his The Resurrection of God Incarnate(Oxford, 2003) and other works, he has developed a powerful argument for the truth of Christianity by combining the general background evidence for God’s existence with the prior likelihood of the incarnation and the posterior unlikelihood of our having the evidence we do for the life, death and resurrection of Christ unless those events were the result of God’s plan of salvation. For a potent summary of Swinburne’s case, see his new article, “The Probability of the Resurrection of Jesus.” This article appears in the Winter 2013 issueof Philosophia Christi, and provides the central focus for that issue’s broader discussion of the merits and potential of ramified natural theology.

Swinburne’s approach is by no means uncontroversial. Some oppose the very idea of natural theology, preferring a presuppositionalist approach. On the other hand, some evidentialists hold that the existence of God can be argued directly from the case for the resurrection without building a prior case for theism. Between these poles there is a spectrum of intermediate positions, some closer to Swinburne’s preferred methodology than others. There are also alternatives to Swinburne’s Bayesian formulation that may be worth exploring.

One topic deserving critical discussion is the merit of Swinburne’s approach as compared to alternative methodologies. It would also be interesting to consider what impact an expanded notion of natural theology has on the standard distinctions between revealed and natural theology and between natural theology and natural science. Will some of the hard and fast distinctions of the past break down? Should they? An interesting implication of ramified natural theology is that scripture can be used as a source of public evidence without presuming inspiration, so that it functions in a quite different way than it does in systematic theology and dogmatics. However, assuming that some version of ramified natural theology has promise, at least as important as these methodological concerns is a consideration of its scope and proper content: what kinds of evidence can and should be folded into an extended natural theology to make the strongest possible case for the truth of Christianity?

Topics in Ramified Natural Theology

To flesh out the possibilities here, consider the following (certainly incomplete) list of topics which might figure in ramified natural theology.
  1. Christian Religious Experience. This is not the standard argument for God based on religious experience but rather the case for Christianity based in part on the particular character of some religious experience. Such experience includes not only personal visions (cf. Phillip Weibe’s Visions of Jesus [Oxford, 1997]), but also church witness (cf. Stanley Hauerwas’ Gifford Addresses inWith the Grain of the Universe [Brazos Press, 2001]).
  2. The Moral Argument for Christianity. The moral argument for God is an important and thriving area of Christian philosophy, but the focus here would be moral arguments, like those of Pascal, which favor a distinctively Christian anthropology and account of God’s saving work.
  3. Fulfilled Bible Prophecy. While not all Bible prophecies meet the stringent demands of public natural theology, it is arguable that some do, and these are enough to mount an important case for the veracity of Christianity. Important work in this area has been done by Hugh Gauch, John Bloom, and Robert Newman (Philosophia Christi 4 (2002):45-88).
  4. The Problem of Evil. Traditional approaches concern the compatibility of a good God with moral and natural evil. However, Eleonore Stump’s approach (in Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering [Oxford, 2010]), treats the narratives about evil in scripture as candidates for an adequate account of evil. And some argue that only an explicitly Christocentric approach is adequate to address the most difficult issues, such as “gratuitous” and “radical” evil.
  5. Natural Theology’s Case for Christ’s Resurrection. This is arguably the supreme topic of ramified natural theology, developed by Swinburne and, in a somewhat different way, by Timothy and Lydia McGrew, in the last chapter of the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Blackwell, 2009). Swinburne’s approach makes the evidence for generic theism crucially relevant to the case for the resurrection whereas it is only indirectly relevant in the argument made by the McGrews. A paper by Hugh Gauch commenting on the differing methodologies of Swinburne and the McGrews appears in the Winter 2011 issue of Philosophia Christi.

The last topic raises again the whole issue of how we assess promising methodologies for ramified natural theology. Is there one best method, or several approaches which may have value, perhaps depending on the target audience or other worldviews actively in competition with Christianity? Are some methods fatally flawed because they rely on a mistaken anthropology or on inscrutable or inaccessible probabilities? Can defenders of ramified natural theology provide convincing replies to their critics? Are there viable compromise positions that should be explored?

Call for Papers: Ramified Natural Theology

CALL FOR PAPERS

Special Issue of Philosophia Christi on
Ramified Natural Theology

Guest Editors: Angus Menuge and Charles Taliaferro

Assistant Editors: Lydia and Timothy McGrew

The Project of Ramified Natural Theology

As usually conceived, natural theology aims to justify belief in the existence of God without relying on the authority of divine revelation. However, even if successful, such a “bare” or “generic” approach fails to discriminate among competing theistic religions. Recently, however, scholars have argued that it is possible to develop natural theological arguments to count decisively in favor of the Christian portrayal of God. This is really a revival and extension of the approach taken by some of the church fathers and Pascal, who emphasized the way the evidence for miracles and fulfilled prophecy favor Christianity over rival religions. Richard Swinburne has dubbed this approach ramified natural theology, and in his The Resurrection of God Incarnate (Oxford, 2003) and other works, he has developed a powerful argument for the truth of Christianity by combining the general background evidence for God’s existence with the prior likelihood of the incarnation and the posterior unlikelihood of our having the evidence we do for the life, death and resurrection of Christ unless those events were the result of God’s plan of salvation. For a potent summary of Swinburne’s case, see his new article, “The Probability of the Resurrection of Jesus.” This article, which will appear in the special issue of Philosophia Christi, provides the central focus for that issue’s broader discussion of the merits and potential of ramified natural theology.

Swinburne’s approach is by no means uncontroversial. Some oppose the very idea of natural theology, preferring a presuppositionalist approach. On the other hand, some evidentialists hold that the existence of God can be argued directly from the case for the resurrection without building a prior case for theism. Between these poles there is a spectrum of intermediate positions, some closer to Swinburne’s preferred methodology than others. There are also alternatives to Swinburne’s Bayesian formulation that may be worth exploring.

One topic deserving critical discussion is the merit of Swinburne’s approach as compared to alternative methodologies. It would also be interesting to consider what impact an expanded notion of natural theology has on the standard distinctions between revealed and natural theology and between natural theology and natural science. Will some of the hard and fast distinctions of the past break down? Should they? An interesting implication of ramified natural theology is that scripture can be used as a source of public evidence without presuming inspiration, so that it functions in a quite different way than it does in systematic theology and dogmatics. However, assuming that some version of ramified natural theology has promise, at least as important as these methodological concerns is a consideration of its scope and proper content: what kinds of evidence can and should be folded into an extended natural theology to make the strongest possible case for the truth of Christianity?

Topics in Ramified Natural Theology

To flesh out the possibilities here, consider the following (certainly incomplete) list of topics which might figure in ramified natural theology.
  1. Christian Religious Experience. This is not the standard argument for God based on religious experience but rather the case for Christianity based in part on the particular character of some religious experience. Such experience includes not only personal visions (cf. Phillip Weibe’s Visions of Jesus [Oxford, 1997]), but also church witness (cf. Stanley Hauerwas’ Gifford Addresses in With the Grain of the Universe [Brazos Press, 2001]).
  2. The Moral Argument for Christianity. The moral argument for God is an important and thriving area of Christian philosophy, but the focus here would be moral arguments, like those of Pascal, which favor a distinctively Christian anthropology and account of God’s saving work.
  3. Fulfilled Bible Prophecy. While not all Bible prophecies meet the stringent demands of public natural theology, it is arguable that some do, and these are enough to mount an important case for the veracity of Christianity. Important work in this area has been done by Hugh Gauch, John Bloom, and Robert Newman (Philosophia Christi 4 (2002):45-88).
  4. The Problem of Evil. Traditional approaches concern the compatibility of a good God with moral and natural evil. However, Eleonore Stump’s approach (in Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering [Oxford, 2010]), treats the narratives about evil in scripture as candidates for an adequate account of evil. And some argue that only an explicitly Christocentric approach is adequate to address the most difficult issues, such as “gratuitous” and “radical” evil.
  5. Natural Theology’s Case for Christ’s Resurrection. This is arguably the supreme topic of ramified natural theology, developed by Swinburne and, in a somewhat different way, by Timothy and Lydia McGrew, in the last chapter of the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Blackwell, 2009). Swinburne’s approach makes the evidence for generic theism crucially relevant to the case for the resurrection whereas it is only indirectly relevant in the argument made by the McGrews. A paper by Hugh Gauch commenting on the differing methodologies of Swinburne and the McGrews appears in the Winter 2011 issue of Philosophia Christi.

The last topic raises again the whole issue of how we assess promising methodologies for ramified natural theology. Is there one best method, or several approaches which may have value, perhaps depending on the target audience or other worldviews actively in competition with Christianity? Are some methods fatally flawed because they rely on a mistaken anthropology or on inscrutable or inaccessible probabilities? Can defenders of ramified natural theology provide convincing replies to their critics? Are there viable compromise positions that should be explored?

Invited papers

We invite the submission of new (fresh, innovative and previously unpublished) papers that advance the understanding of ramified natural theology as outlined above. The ideal paper will be closely focused on one of the following main areas:
  1. an assessment, defense or critique of the project of ramified natural theology;
  2. an evaluation of the impact of ramified natural theology on our understanding of other areas of theology, epistemology, apologetics, or natural science;
  3. an assessment of the quality and quantity of evidence that might be marshaled in a ramified natural theological argument focused on one of the topics listed above or on another topic.

Regarding alternative topics, especially welcome would be a case depending on a line of evidence which has been neglected or insufficiently explored. Some examples might be the following. Can the arguments from reason or consciousness be developed to favor Christianity? Are human rights and human flourishing better explained by Christianity than its theistic and non-theistic rivals?

Word limits, style and publication formats

Due to space restrictions, preference will be given to shorter, highly focused, high quality papers (3,000-5,000 words) that make a specific, important point and engage closely with extant work in ramified natural theology. The submission of broad surveys and works on tangentially relevant topics is not encouraged. All essays should follow the style and typographic standards specified by Philosophia Christi. Most notably, all articles should follow the Chicago Manual of Style (16th ed.), use twelve-point font and be double-spaced.

In order to encourage a wide range of quality contributions, Philosophia Christi has graciously agreed to allow two modes of publication. Some accepted articles will appear in the print journal. Other accepted articles will appear in an online archive. This dual mode of publication will allow a larger number of papers to be published, will better reflect the broad range of relevant issues, and will help to facilitate wide discussion and increased interest in Philosophia Christi and the work of the Evangelical Philosophical Society.

Deadline for submission

All submitted papers for this special issue are due by 31st of March, 2013. This ample deadline is absolutely firm (no late submissions will be accepted) and is intended to inspire fresh works of the highest quality, which significantly advance the case for (or against) ramified natural theology.

Mode of submission

Please submit papers through Philosophia Christi’s online submission process with attention to the “Special Issue in Ramified Natural Theology.”

Historical Apologetics Project—help needed

Timothy McGrew, an epistemologist deeply interested in apologetics, has taken it upon himself to develop a colossal (not 30MB, 30 *GB*) digital library of historical apologetics. To get a sampling of his work, (just the tip of a Titanic sinking ice-berg) check out the link below:

http://www.lydiamcgrew.com/Historicalapologeticsreadinglist.htm

What Tim and I are hoping is that there are faculty and grad students who have good ideas about how these historical resources might best be used. One idea is that they could be indexed by problem/objection for/to the Christian faith so that working apologists could quickly find the relevant passages. Might this, for example, be a worthy project for students enrolled in the MA program in apologetics at Biola University or similar programs elsewhere?

It would be particularly valuable if these resources would help students select new directions in doctoral research. It seems to me that advisors in philosophy would be more inclined to take dissertations bearing on apologetics seriously if they realized both the caliber of some of the great historical apologists and their unjustified neglect.

If anyone has constructive proposals as to how this resource can best be used or developed, please contact me and I will convey any response to Tim McGrew. Tim is willing to send his entire digital collection (via portable hard drive) to anyone who is interested in indexing even a single volume or assisting in other ways to develop the resource.

The Nature Miracles of Jesus: Problems, Perspectives, and Prospects

In 2017, Cascade Books published The Nature Miracles of Jesus: Problems, Perspectives, and Prospects by Graham H. Twelftree. Graham H. Twelftree is the Academic Dean and Professor of New Testament and Early Christianity at the London School of Theology. He is the author of numerous books, most recently Paul and the Miraculous: A Historical Reconstruction (2013).

From the publisher’s description of The Nature Miracles of Jesus:

The nature miracle stories of Jesus–walking on the water or feeding thousands with a small amount of food, for example–are so spectacular that many find them a problem, whether historical, philosophical, or even theological. This is the first book to tackle this problem head on. Do the stories reflect events in the life of the historical Jesus, or are they myths or legends? Or, perhaps they grew out of parables or from more ordinary events into the incredible stories we now have. Or, again, perhaps this the wrong approach! A group of high-ranking biblical historians, philosophers, and theologians with very diverse views set out to provide possible answers. Contributors include: – James Crossley – Eric Eve – Craig S. Keener – Michael Levine – Timothy J. McGrew – Scot McKnight – Graham H. Twelftree – Ruben Zimmermann

Philosophia Christi Winter 2011: God and Abstract Objects

The Winter 2011 issue of Philosophia Christi features a unique and interesting discussion about “The Problem of God and Abstract Objects: A Prolegomenon.”

The following contributors and perspectives are represented in this issue:

Keith Yandell, “God and Propositions.”

ABSTRACT: If there are abstract objects, they necessarily exist. The majority view among contemporary philosophers of religion who are theists is that God also necessarily exists. Nonetheless, that God has necessary existence has not been shown to be true, or even (informally) consistent. It seems consistent—at least is doesn’t seem (informally) inconsistent—but neither does its denial. Arguments that necessary existence is a perfection, and God has all perfections, assume that Necessitarian Theism is true, and hence consistent. Thus they do not provide reason to believe that Necessitarian Theism is true. Non-necessitarian (“plain”) theism is on a philosophical par with Necessitarian Theism and can accommodate abstract objects all the while avoiding theological and philosophical refutation.

Richard Davis, “God and the Platonic Horde: A Defense of Limited Conceptualism.”

ABSTRACT: This paper attempts to argue for two main claims: First, it is plausible to think that Conceptualism holds with respect to propositions; in any event, it does a much better job than its closest competitors (Platonism and Nominalism) in accounting for the truthbearing nature of propositions. Secondly, it is wholly implausible (so I say) to take the added step and equate properties and relations with divine concepts. Here I offer additional reasons, beyond ‘divine bootstrapping’, for theists to resist this tempting reduction. Thus, a limited Conceptualism emerges as the most natural and defensible way for a theist to think about God’s relation to abstract objects.

William Lane Craig, “A Nominalist Perspective on God and Abstract Objects.”

ABSTRACT: A metaphysically robust, as opposed to lightweight, Platonism with respect to uncreatable abstract objects is theologically unacceptable because it fatally compromises creatio ex nihilo and divine aseity.  The principal argument for Platonism is the so-called Indispensability Argument based on the ontological commitments required by singular terms and existential quantifiers in true sentences.  Different varieties of Nominalism challenge each of the argument’s premises.  Fictionalism accepts the assumed criterion of ontological commitment but rejects the truth of the relevant sentences.  Neutralism accepts the truth of the relevant sentences but denies the assumed criterion of ontological commitment.  Both of these perspectives, but especially the last, are plausible routes available for the Christian theist.

Guest Editor Paul Gould also offers a handy, substantive, and engaging introduction to the above contributions in light of the overall discussion in the relevant literature.

ABSTRACT: How does God relate to abstract objects, if there be any? Any adequate solution to this question quickly leads to deep waters philosophical and theological. In this essay, I attempt to bring clarity to the debate related to the problem of God and abstract objects by first explicating as precisely as possible the problem and then by imposing some order into the debate by classifying various contemporary answers to the problem.

In addition to the above, see James Anderson’s and Greg Welty’s complimentary article, “The Lord of Noncontradiction: An Argument for God from Logic”

ABSTRACT: In this paper we offer a new argument for the existence of God. We content that the laws of logic are metaphysically dependent on the existence of god, understood as a necessarily existent, personal, spiritual being; thus anyone who grants that there are laws of logic should also accept that there is a God. We argue that if our most natural intuitions about them are correct, and if they are to play the role in our intellectual activities that we take them to play, then the laws of logic are best construed as necessarily existent thoughts – more specifically, as divine thoughts about divine thoughts. We conclude by highlighting some implications for both theistic arguments and antitheistic arguments.

Unrelated to the above theme, Hugh Gauch’s article is must-reading, if for no other reason than how it relates to a new EPS Call for Papers on “Ramified Natural Theology.”

“Natural Theology’s Case for Jesus’s Resurrection: Methodological and Statistical Considerations”

ABSTRACT: An important 2003 book by Richard Swinburne and 2009 chapter by Timothy and Lydia McGrew develop the case for the bodily resurrection of Jesus as a project in ramified natural theology featuring public evidence. This paper imports a model for full disclosure of arguments from natural science to specific natural theology’s methodological and statistical requirements. Four matters need further clarification in this project’s ongoing development: the strength of the evidence, hypotheses being tested, dependence on generic natural theology, and range of evidence considered relative to apostolic precedents. The related historiographical method of Michael Licona is also discussed.

You really don’t want miss this Winter 2011 issue, especially if you are an avid reader in metaphysics and philosophical theology!

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